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INTRODUCTION 
On April 2, 2005, the world mourned the death of the servant of God, 
Karol Wojtyla, who as Pope John Paul II served for twenty-six years as the 
Bishop of Rome and Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church.  Many popular 
commentators saw in his passing the death of a “world leader,” a figure who 
loomed large on the diplomatic stage, a champion of the cause of peace, and a 
man who played a significant role in helping to bring about the downfall of 
Communism in his native Poland and throughout Central and Eastern Europe.1  
While history will surely acknowledge John Paul’s involvement in world 
events, these descriptions fail to capture the essence of the man and his life, 
namely, that of being a disciple of Jesus Christ.  Like all Christian disciples 
since the twelve apostles, he fervently sought, through word and example, to 
share the Gospel with those around him.  Thus, in the death of John Paul II, the 
world saw the passing of one of the great witnesses to the Christian faith.2 
In virtually every aspect of his ministry as Peter’s successor, John Paul 
worked to overcome the tumult and confusion that defined the immediate post-
conciliar era by bringing to the Church and the world an authentic 
understanding of the Second Vatican Council.3  Indeed, the major themes of 
 
 1. See, e.g., JOHN O’SULLIVAN, THE PRESIDENT, THE POPE, AND THE PRIME MINISTER: 
THREE WHO CHANGED THE WORLD (2006) (discussing the efforts of Ronald Reagan, Pope John 
Paul II, and Margaret Thatcher to end Communism); David Remnick, John Paul II, NEW 
YORKER, Apr. 11, 2005, at 21–23 (describing John Paul largely in terms of his opposition to 
world Communism). 
 2. For a thorough account of the late Holy Father’s life and work, see GEORGE WEIGEL, 
WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II (1999).  In addition to his 
extraordinary record of formal teaching, discussed infra, John Paul’s love for Christ and thus his 
witness to the Christian faith can be seen most vividly and dramatically in his act of forgiveness 
and reconciliation with his would-be assassin, Mehmet Ali Agca, see id. at 412–14, and his public 
suffering and death from Parkinson’s disease and other ailments. 
 3. See, e.g., Tracey Rowland, Reclaiming the Tradition: John Paul II as the Authentic 
Interpreter of Vatican II, in JOHN PAUL THE GREAT: MAKER OF THE POST-CONCILIAR CHURCH 
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John Paul’s pontificate gave concrete expression to many of the themes of the 
Council itself.  This can be seen in his efforts to “confirm the brethren in the 
faith”4 by providing the faithful with a sound basis for a correct understanding 
of Christian doctrine and practice;5 in his efforts to ensure observation of the 
Christian Sabbath6 and prayerful celebration of the sacraments including, 
preeminently, the Eucharist;7 in his outreach to the Jewish people and his 
 
(William Oddie ed., 2005); DAVID L. SCHINDLER, HEART OF THE WORLD, CENTER OF THE 
CHURCH: COMMUNIO ECCLESIOLOGY, LIBERALISM, AND LIBERATION 30 (1996) (arguing that 
John Paul’s communio ecclesiology represents the authentic teaching of Vatican II); Richard John 
Neuhaus, Rome Diary: April 11: Remembering John Paul II, FIRST THINGS, June/July 2005, at 
58, 62 (“Among the many achievements of the pontificate of John Paul II, some would say the 
most important achievement, was to secure the hermeneutic for the interpretation of that great 
council.”). 
 4. Luke 22:23. 
 5. POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION Fidei Depositum (1992) (marking the 
publication of the Catechism of the Catholic Church), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_ 
father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_19921011_fidei-depositum_ 
en.html. 
 6. POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER Dies Domini (1998) (on keeping the Lord’s 
Day holy), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/ 
hf_jp-ii_apl_05071998_dies-domini_en.html. 
 7. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Ecclesia de Eucharistia (2003) (on the 
Eucharist in its relationship to the Church), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
special_features/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_20030417_ecclesia_eucharistia_en.html; 
POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER Mane Nobiscum Domine (2004) (reflecting on the Year 
of the Eucharist), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_20041008_mane-nobiscum-domine_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
APOSTOLIC LETTER Misericordia Dei (2002) (on the sacrament of reconciliation), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/motu_proprio/documents/hf_jp-ii_motu-proprio_ 
20020502_misericordia-dei_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION Familiaris 
Consortio (1981) (on Christian marriage and the family in the modern world), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_1981 
122familiaris-consortio_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, LETTER TO FAMILIES Gratissimam Sane 
(1994) (reflecting on the Year of the Family), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
john_paul_ii/letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_02021994_families_en.html. 
  The intimate connection between the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist was a 
theme that John Paul addressed at the very beginning of his pontificate.  See POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
ENCYCLICAL LETTER Redemptor Hominis, para. 20 (1979) [hereinafter Redemptor Hominis], 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_ 
04031979_redemptor-hominis_en.html; see also CONGREGATION FOR DIVINE WORSHIP AND THE 
DISCIPLINE OF SACRAMENTS, INSTRUCTION ON THE USE OF VERNACULAR LANGUAGES IN THE 
PUBLICATION OF THE BOOKS OF THE ROMAN LITURGY Liturgiam Authenticam (2001), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_doc_2001 
0507_liturgiam-authenticam_en.html; CONGREGATION FOR DIVINE WORSHIP AND THE 
DISCIPLINE OF SACRAMENTS, INSTRUCTION ON CERTAIN MATTERS TO BE OBSERVED OR TO BE 
AVOIDED REGARDING THE MOST HOLY EUCHARIST Redemptionis Sacramentum (2004), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccdds/documents/rc_con_ccdds_ 
doc_20040423_redemptionis-sacramentum_en.html. 
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sorrow to God for the sins committed in the name of Christ and his Church;8 in 
his untiring work to secure human dignity through the recognition of human 
rights including the right to life9 and the right to religious freedom;10 in his 
ecumenical efforts to achieve genuine unity among all the separated followers 
of Christ;11 in his work on behalf of inter-religious dialogue;12 and in his 
challenge to the cultural and intellectual malaise of modern society.13  In 
pursuing these themes, the late Pope put to good use his stunning intellect, his 
 
 8. See generally JOHN PAUL II IN THE HOLY LAND: IN HIS OWN WORDS (Lawrence Boadt, 
CSP & Kevin di Camillo eds., 2005) (collection of homilies, prayers, and addresses of John Paul 
II during his trip to Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel, including his address at Yad Vashem and 
his prayer at the Western Wall); LUIGI ACCATTOLI, WHEN A POPE ASKS FORGIVENESS (Jordan 
Aumann trans., 1998) (collection of prayers and addresses by John Paul which seek forgiveness 
for the sins of Christians).  For a thoughtful essay on the proper interpretation of John Paul’s 
statements regarding forgiveness, see Mary Ann Glendon, Contrition in the Age of Spin Control, 
FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1997, at 10.  See also The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, FIRST 
THINGS, May 1998, at 39 (setting forth the text of the Holy See’s Commission for Religious 
Relations with the Jews, We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah, as well as the text of John 
Paul II’s letter to Edward Cardinal Cassidy, the head of the Commission). 
 9. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Evangelium Vitae (1995) [hereinafter 
Evangelium Vitae] (addressing the threats to human life presented by legal abortion, euthanasia, 
and capital punishment), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html. 
 10. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations 
Organization (Oct. 5, 1995), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
speeches/1995/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_05101995_address-to-uno_en.html; Pope John 
Paul II, On the Value and Content of Freedom of Conscience and of Religion (Sept. 1, 1980), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/pont_messages/1980/ 
documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19800901_helsinki-act_en.html; Pope John Paul II, Address of His 
Holiness John Paul II to the 34th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 2, 
1979), in PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF THE HOLY SEE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, PATHS 
TO PEACE: A CONTRIBUTION: DOCUMENTS OF THE HOLY SEE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 16, 23–24 (Liturgical Publications, Inc. 1987). 
 11. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Ut Unum Sint (1995) [hereinafter Ut Unum 
Sint] (on the Church’s commitment to ecumenism), available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25051995_ut-unum-sint_en.html. 
 12. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Address to the Representatives of the Christian Churches 
and Ecclesial Communities and of the World Religions (Oct. 27, 1986), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1986/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_ 
19861027_prayer-peace-assisi-final_en.html; see also CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF 
THE FAITH, DECLARATION ON THE UNICITY AND SALVIFIC UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS CHRIST AND 
THE CHURCH Dominus Iesus (2000) (rejecting the purported identification of other religions with 
Christianity and the claim that there is salvation outside of the redemption won by Christ), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_ 
doc_20000806_dominus-iesus_en.html. 
 13. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Fides et Ratio (1998) [hereinafter Fides et 
Ratio], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_14091998_fides-et-ratio_en.html. 
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gift for oratory and flair for the dramatic, and his warm touch as a dedicated 
pastor and true spiritual father.  Thus, it is no surprise that, even before his 
death, some began to refer to the Pope, without exaggeration, as “John Paul the 
Great.” 14 
Although the late Pontiff was not a lawyer, his writings on the purpose and 
nature of law are quite substantial.  Indeed, even a cursory examination of the 
contents of the rich pontificate just ended shows that this is an enormous topic.  
Throughout his numerous encyclicals, apostolic exhortations and letters, 
homilies, and addresses, the late Holy Father was a passionate defender of both 
democracy and the rule of law.15  In the exercise of his teaching office, John 
Paul self-consciously sought to recover an authentic understanding of law, an 
understanding that had been obscured by the distorted notion of autonomy 
embraced by the liberal democracies of the West and lost in the tragic 
disregard for the individual that typified the legal regimes of countries under 
socialism.16  John Paul’s teaching concerning the relationship between 
freedom, truth, and law is especially noteworthy in this regard.17 
Part of the intellectual work that must be performed in every discipline is 
the work of circumscribing the limits of the discipline itself.  Indeed, in order 
to carry the discipline forward, it is vitally important to know what lies within 
its boundaries and what exceeds them.  The same can be said of the terms and 
definitions that make up the conceptual framework within a given field of 
study.  That is, in order to understand a particular concept, it is necessary to be 
 
 14. In 1997, somewhat audaciously, CRISIS magazine featured a picture of John Paul on its 
cover with this honorific.  See CRISIS, Nov. 1997.  While some doubt whether John Paul is truly 
deserving of the title, see, for example, Susan A. Ross & Robert Louis Wilken, A Measure of 
Greatness—The Papacy of John Paul II: Two Assessments, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 10, 2003, 
referring to the late Pontiff in this manner has become common place.  See, e.g., PEGGY 
NOONAN, JOHN PAUL THE GREAT: REMEMBERING A SPIRITUAL FATHER (2005).  Indeed, Pope 
Benedict XVI routinely refers to his beloved predecessor in this fashion.  See Ian Fisher, 
Cardinals Choose a Close Aid to John Paul II to Lead Church, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 2005. 
 15. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION Ecclesia in 
America, para. 19 (1999) (applauding the “growing support for democratic political systems” in 
the Americas but insisting that “[t]here can be no rule of law . . . unless citizens and especially 
leaders are convinced that there is no freedom without truth”), available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_22011999_ecclesia-in-
america_en.html. 
 16. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Centesimus Annus, para. 47 (1991) 
[hereinafter Centesimus Annus], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY 
HERITAGE 439 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992) [hereinafter CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL THOUGHT] (“Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the 
basis of a correct conception of the human person.”), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_ 
father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus_en.html. 
 17. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Veritatis Splendor, paras. 35–53 (1993) 
[hereinafter Veritatis Splendor], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html. 
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able to identify that to which it refers, as well as that to which it does not.  
Because law is a normative discipline, its boundaries are not merely 
conceptual.  They are also prudential. 
The topic I wish to explore in the essay that follows is how John Paul II 
helped to perform this important task with respect to law.  He reminded us of 
the limits of law, of what exceeds the competence of juridical authority.  
Briefly put, the law may be employed as a means of eliminating or reforming 
the systemic defects or problems in society that the late pontiff referred to as 
“structures of sin,” but because it cannot reach the recesses of the human heart, 
law is severely limited in bringing about true social transformation.18  Where 
the ambitions behind a given statute or judicial opinion go beyond law’s 
capacity to achieve justice and promote the common good, modesty dictates a 
different course.  To put the matter in a slightly different fashion, John Paul’s 
thought helped to identify the somewhat nebulous line where law ends and 
society begins.  In doing so, John Paul contributed to the long tradition of 
reflection on the meaning of “culture” and its relationship to law found in the 
Catholic intellectual tradition in general and the Church’s social teaching in 
particular.  For reasons that I hope will be clear, the place I wish to begin this 
examination of John Paul’s work is not with a close study of one of his many 
magisterial texts, but with a passage from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov.19  Indeed, this remarkable passage succinctly captures many of the 
central tenets of modern Catholic social thought, including the work of John 
Paul II. 
Furthermore, in a recent article, David Skeel and William Stuntz argue in 
favor of legal modesty, a virtue that they say coincides with the understanding 
of law that emerges from a correct reading of the Christian Bible.20  Arguing 
from an Evangelical perspective, they contend that the law is ill-suited to 
address a number of social ills to which it is frequently directed, including, 
conspicuously, the problem of abortion.21  They criticize the practice of 
enacting merely symbolic laws, a vice they term “legal moralism.”22  Because 
these sorts of laws are seldom enforced, they cannot teach the public the values 
that they purportedly embody.23  Moreover, because these laws often take the 
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Andrew H. MacAndrew trans., 
Bantam Books, 1981) (1880). 
 20. David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 813 (2006) (“If our society is to recover the rule of law, it must be a more 
modest law that rules.”); id. at 815 (“These Biblical principles lead, in other words, to the same 
rule-of-law principles that our legal system purports to honor.”). 
 21. Id. at 831–39. 
 22. Id. at 832. 
 23. Id. at 836 n.117. 
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form of extensive moral codes, they undermine the rule of law as a whole by 
vesting an inordinate amount of discretion in the hands of public officials.24 
A great deal of Skeel and Stuntz’s argument coincides with what John Paul 
had to say about the limits of law.  Nevertheless, their reflections would have 
benefited from a fuller engagement with the Christian intellectual tradition, 
including the social magisterium of John Paul II.  In the essay that follows I 
hope to show first, with respect to abortion, that Skeel and Stuntz fail to make 
the case that a concern for legal modesty should trump a concern for the 
protection of unborn human life.  Put another way, Skeel and Stuntz fail to 
demonstrate that the value of prudence for safeguarding the integrity of the 
rule of law should outweigh the pursuit of justice, properly understood.  
Second, I shall argue that, contrary to Skeel and Stuntz’s assertions, anti-
abortion laws are not merely symbolic.  Indeed, the available evidence 
indicates that various kinds of restrictions have been effective in curbing the 
frequency of abortion.25  Third and finally, I shall argue that Skeel and Stuntz 
fail to fully appreciate the different ways in which law effectively instructs 
those who are subject to it.  Indeed, as the late Pope well knew, a particular law 
can serve a vital teaching function that goes beyond the specific instances in 
which it is enforced.  In this way, the law can reaffirm the values already 
present in a given culture and so reinforce the non-legal norms operating 
within it. 
I.  FATHER ZOSIMA AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 
John Paul’s views on the limits of law—of the inability of law to serve as 
the primary vehicle for truly profound social change—are beautifully captured 
in a passage from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov.26  Although 
Dostoevsky was an Orthodox Christian whose criticism and Russian suspicion 
of the Roman Catholic Church appear throughout his novels, he is in many 
ways a deeply Catholic writer.  The themes he explores—themes of suffering, 
mercy, and redemption, of the wretched nature of the human condition, and of 
man’s ineluctable desire to touch the divine—in fact underscore the profound 
communion that still exists between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West, 
a true unity of heart and mind that existed for a millennium before the Great 
Schism and which can be fully realized once again.27 Given this common 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra Part V.B. 
 26. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19. 
 27. But see Ralph C. Wood, Ivan Karamazov’s Mistake, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2002, at 29 
(“Though he was a student of Western Christianity and culture, Dostoevsky remained 
fundamentally Russian in his conception of God and the world, of good and evil, of the sacred 
and the secular.  We cannot properly understand his treatment of these matters, therefore, until we 
grasp his Orthodox reading of them.”). 
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heritage and John Paul’s fervent hope to bring about the reunion of East and 
West, to see the Church once again “breathe with her two lungs,”28 perhaps it 
is not surprising that Dostoevsky would share the Pope’s understanding of 
what law can and cannot accomplish. 
The Brothers Karamazov tells the story of three brothers, Ivan, Dmitry, 
and Alyosha, and their lecherous drunkard father, Fyodor Karamazov.29  
Before Fyodor’s murder at the hands of his bastard child Smerdyakov—the 
central point of action in the novel—Alyosha suffers another kind of loss.30  
His friend and spiritual mentor, Father Zosima, the elder of the monastery 
where Alyosha serves as a novice, is ill and near death.31  Before passing away, 
however, Father Zosima shares with Alyosha and his other visitors the story of 
his life prior to becoming a monk.32 
As a young man, Zosima was an officer in the military who became 
infatuated with a young woman.33  She later married another young man while 
the future monk was away on assignment.34  Zosima later learned that the 
woman had in fact been engaged to the other man throughout the period of 
their friendship.35  The young officer had only imagined their future romance 
together.36  Eager to save his pride, Zosima provokes his would-be rival by 
publicly insulting the man, and the two agree to a duel with pistols.37  In the 
morning before the duel is to take place, however, Zosima experiences a 
conversion in which he recognizes his own absurd vanity and sees plainly the 
overwhelming mercy of God.38  He is overcome by the conviction that “every 
one of us is answerable for everyone else.”39 
 
 28. Ut Unum Sint, supra note 11, para. 54; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC LETTER 
Orientale Lumen (1995) (appreciating the special gifts of the Eastern churches and insisting on 
the need to bring about full communion among all the particular churches in the one Church of 
Christ), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_ 
jp-ii_apl_02051995_orientale-lumen_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER 
Slavorum Apostoli (1985) (reflecting in part on the catholicity of the Church and of the common 
ecclesial and cultural heritage of the Slavic churches, both Catholic and Orthodox), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_19850602_ 
slavorum-apostoli_en.html. 
 29. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 9. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 340. 
 32. Id. at 344–92. 
 33. Id. at 356. 
 34. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 356–57. 
 35. Id. at 357. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 358–59. 
 39. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19,at 359. 
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Although hoping to avoid any bloodshed, Zosima dutifully attends the 
duel.40  His opponent fires the first shot grazing him across the cheek.41  
Zosima then tosses his own pistol aside and asks the man for forgiveness for 
deliberately offending him and so compelling him to attempt to take the life of 
another.42  Although berated by his fellow officers at first, they accept his 
conduct as a courageous act when he tells them that he has resigned his 
commission and has decided to enter the monastery.43  While his resignation is 
pending, Zosima becomes the talk of the town.44  He enjoys a period of new-
found celebrity and is a frequent guest at numerous parties and gatherings.45 
On one such occasion he is introduced to Mikhail, a mysterious older 
visitor with a special interest in Zosima’s story of forgiveness.46  The two 
become friends and spend many late nights in conversation.47  We later learn 
that, many years before, Mikhail killed a young woman who rejected his 
marriage proposal.48  Suspicion fell on one of the murdered woman’s servants 
who died in the midst of the trial.  Thus, although everyone believed that 
justice had been served, the crime was never solved.49  One evening, before 
confessing his crime to Zosima, Mikhail and the future monk talk about the 
state of the world and how it can be changed.50  In recalling the conversation, 
Zosima relates the following: 
He spoke with fervor and looked at me mysteriously, as if asking something of 
me. 
“As to every man being answerable for everybody and everything, not just for 
his own sins,” he went on, “you are absolutely right about it, and the way you 
succeeded in grasping that idea so fully, all at once, is really remarkable.  It is 
true that when men understand that idea, the kingdom of God will no longer be 
a dream but a reality.” 
“But when do you expect that to happen?”  I cried bitterly.  “When will it 
come about, if ever?  Perhaps it’s just a dream and nothing more.” 
“So you don’t believe yourself,” he answered, “in the things you preach to 
others.  Let me tell you, then, that this dream, as you call it, will most certainly 
come true.  You may rest assured of that, but it will not happen immediately, 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 360. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 360–62. 
 44. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 362. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 364–65. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 367–68. 
 49. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 369. 
 50. Id. at 365–66. 
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because everything that happens in the world is controlled by its own set of 
laws.  In this case, it is a psychological matter, a state of mind.  In order to 
change the world, man’s way of thinking must be changed.  Thus, there can be 
no brotherhood of men before all men become each other’s brothers.  There is 
no science, no order based on the pursuit of material gain, that will enable men 
to share their goods fairly and to respect each other’s rights.  There will never 
be enough to satisfy everyone; men will always be envious of their neighbors 
and will always destroy one another.  So to your question when heaven on 
earth will come about, I can only promise you that it will come without fail, 
but first the period of man’s isolation must come to an end.” 
“What isolation?”  I asked him. 
“The isolation that you find everywhere, particularly in our age.  But it won’t 
come to an end right now, because the time has not yet come.  Today everyone 
asserts his own personality and strives to live a full life as an individual.  But 
these efforts lead not to a full life but to suicide, because, instead of realizing 
his personality, man only slips into total isolation.  For in our age mankind has 
been broken up into self-contained individuals, each of whom retreats into his 
lair, trying to stay away from the rest, hiding himself and his belongings from 
the rest of mankind, and finally isolating himself from people and people from 
him.  And, while he accumulates material wealth in his isolation, he thinks 
with satisfaction how mighty and secure he has become, because he is mad and 
cannot see that the more goods he accumulates, the deeper he sinks into 
suicidal impotence.  The reason for this is that he has become accustomed to 
relying only on himself; he has split off from the whole and become an isolated 
unit; he has trained his soul not to rely on human help, not to believe in men 
and mankind, and only to worry that the wealth and privileges he has 
accumulated may get lost.  Everywhere men today are turning scornfully away 
from the truth that the security of the individual cannot be achieved by his 
isolated efforts but only by mankind as a whole. 
“But an end to this fearful isolation is bound to come and all men will 
understand how unnatural it was for them to have isolated themselves from one 
another.  This will be the spirit of the new era and people will look back in 
amazement at the past, when they sat in darkness and refused to see the light.  
And it is then that the sign of the Son of Man will appear in the heavens . . . 
But until that day we must keep hope alive, and now and then a man must set 
an example, if only an isolated one, by trying to lift his soul out of its isolation 
and offering it up in an act of brotherly communion, even if he is taken for one 
of God’s fools.  This is necessary, to keep the great idea alive.”51 
 
 51. Id. 
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A. Materialism and Alienation: The Characteristics of Modern Social Life 
Father Zosima’s interlocutor offers a diagnosis of the ills of modern 
society that is strikingly similar to the Church’s social teaching in a number of 
important respects.  First, he identifies the central problem of modern society 
as that of “isolation,”52 an attitude and plan of action in which “everyone 
asserts his own personality and strives to live a full life as an individual.”53  
This in turn leads to the atomization of society, “broken up into self-contained 
individuals, each of whom retreats into his lair, trying to stay away from the 
rest.”54  The isolated person “become[s] accustomed to relying only on 
himself” and so places his or her hope for self-sufficiency and realization in the 
accumulation of material wealth.55  Mikhail assures his friend that this desire to 
separate one’s self from others is “unnatural,” “mad,” and a kind of “suicidal 
impotence” since “the security of the individual cannot be achieved by his 
isolated efforts but only by mankind as a whole.”56 
Throughout her social magisterium, the Church has taught that the human 
person can realize his or her authentic good and happiness only in and through 
community.  As the Second Vatican Council stated, social life is something 
that is integral to the human person and “not something added on to man.”57  
Indeed, although man often abuses his freedom by “indulg[ing] in too many of 
life’s comforts and imprisons himself in a kind of splendid isolation,”58 the 
Council insisted that “God did not create man for life in isolation, but for the 
formation of social unity.”59  As Pope Paul VI neatly summarized, writing 
shortly after the Council, “man finds his true identity only in his social 
milieu.”60  In the contemporary world, however, the human person experiences 
“a new loneliness . . . not in the face of a hostile nature which it has taken 
 
 52. Id. at 366.  Plainly, this phenomenon has not escaped the notice even of those critics 
writing from a secular point of view.  See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the phenomenon of the 
disintegration of social structures in everyday life). 
 53. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 366. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH 
IN THE MODERN WORLD Gaudium et Spes, para. 25 (1965) [hereinafter Gaudium et Spes], 
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 166, 181, available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207 
_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. 
 58. Id. para. 31. 
 59. Id. para. 32. 
 60. POPE PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Populorum Progressio, para. 36 (1967) 
[hereinafter Populorum Progressio], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 
240, 248, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_26031967_populorum_en.html. 
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centuries to subdue, but in an anonymous crowd which surrounds him and in 
which he feels himself a stranger.”61 
The Church’s social tradition acknowledges the fact that, as a corporeal 
being, the human person needs material possessions in order to survive.62  
Beyond the desire to live in reasonable comfort, however, many people are 
“infected with a practical materialism,”63 such that, especially in developed 
countries, people “seem to be hypnotized, as it were, by economics, so that 
almost their entire personal and social life is permeated with a certain 
economic way of thinking.”64  When the salient feature of a given society 
becomes an excessive concern with material possessions, then “men harden 
their hearts, shut out others from their minds and gather together solely for 
reasons of self-interest rather than out of friendship; dissension and disunity 
follow soon after.”65  Indeed, in this context, the pursuit of material things 
“prevents man’s growth as a human being and stands in opposition to his true 
 
 61. POPE PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER Octogesima Adveniens, para. 10 (1971) [hereinafter 
Octogesima Adveniens], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 265, 268, 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/apost_letters/documents/hf_p-vi_apl_ 
19710514_octogesima-adveniens_en.html. 
 62. See POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Rerum Novarum, para. 34 (1891) [hereinafter 
Rerum Novarum], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 14, 31, available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_ 
rerum-novarum_en.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Laborem Exercens, para. 1 
(1981) [hereinafter Laborem Exercens], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, 
at 352–53 (through work man earns “the daily bread by which his body keeps alive”), available 
at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981 
_laborem-exercens_en.html; Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 14 (“Through his bodily 
composition [man] gathers to himself the elements of the material world . . . [and] . . . through 
him [they] raise their voice in free praise of the Creator.”). 
 63. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 10; see also Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 
23 (declaring that a “practical materialism”—as opposed to a deeply theoretical materialism such 
as can be found in Marxist thought—dominates thought regarding the human body, sexuality, and 
procreation such that the criterion of personal dignity “is replaced by the criterion of efficiency, 
functionality and usefulness: others are considered not for what they ‘are’, but for what they 
‘have, do and produce’”).  A “practical materialism” may be distinguished from a “theoretical 
materialism” such as can be found in the thought of philosophers from Lucretius to Marx.  A 
person whose life reflects a practical materialism need not subscribe to some set of metaphysical 
beliefs that confine the nature of reality to material existence.  Instead, a person subscribes to a 
practical materialism when the tacit premises that appear to inform his or her actions in life 
suggest that there is nothing more at stake than the physical consequences of the here and now.  
That is, even if such a person ostensibly believes in God and in the freedom and immortality of 
the human soul, he or she nonetheless acts as if these things did not exist, as if they were not 
intimately involved in the physical make-up of the universe, as if reality were confined to mere 
physicality. 
 64. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 63. 
 65. Populorum Progressio, supra note 60, para. 19. 
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grandeur,”66 a greatness which can only be attained by rejecting the isolation of 
materialism and “enjoy[ing] the higher values of love and friendship, of prayer 
and contemplation.”67 
John Paul was an especially ardent critic of what he called the “error of 
materialism” whereby man’s spiritual and personal dimensions are placed “in a 
position of subordination to material reality.”68  Although deeply critical of the 
theory and practice of socialism, John Paul saw in the consumerism of 
developed countries a “crass materialism”69 involving “an excessive promotion 
of purely utilitarian values, with an appeal to the appetites and inclinations 
towards immediate gratification.”70  In these societies, the human person “is 
seen more as a producer or consumer of goods than as a subject who produces 
and consumes in order to live.”71  Indeed, in a society defined by material 
acquisition and consumption, the human person “is directed towards ‘having’ 
rather than ‘being.’”72  He or she is encouraged to want “to have more, not in 
order to be more but in order to spend life in enjoyment as an end in itself.”73  
Because the aspirations of the human person exceed the bounds of the merely 
physical, the practice of materialism invariably leads to “radical 
dissatisfaction”74 and a sense of alienation.75 
Indeed, in his analysis of alienation in both socialist and liberal societies, 
John Paul offers perhaps the most powerful critique of the modern 
phenomenon that Dostoevsky identifies as “isolation.”76  According to the late 
Pope, Marxism was right to criticize bourgeois capitalist society, but wrong in 
that its criticism was “based on a mistaken and inadequate idea of alienation, 
derived solely from the sphere of relationships of production and ownership.”77  
As such, it understood and attempted to correct the phenomenon of alienation 
entirely in materialist terms.  Thus, Marxism sought to overcome the alienation 
suffered by workers in being separated from the product of their labor through 
the elimination of private property and the collective ownership of the means 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. para. 20. 
 68. Laborem Exercens, supra note 62, para. 13. 
 69. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, para. 28 (1987) 
[hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 
395, 412, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_ 
jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html. 
 70. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 29. 
 71. Id. para. 39. 
 72. Id. para. 36. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69. 
 75. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41. 
 76. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 366. 
 77. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
330 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:317 
of production.78  John Paul noted, however, that the historical experience of 
socialist countries “sadly demonstrated that collectivism does not do away with 
alienation but rather increases it, adding to it a lack of basic necessities and 
economic inefficiency.”79 
In capitalist societies, John Paul observed a distinct but related form of 
alienation.  That is, unlike the economies under socialism, plagued by chronic 
inefficiencies and shortages, capitalist economies have been marked by a 
relatively high level of material prosperity.80  It is this very success, however—
combined with a culture that encourages consumption—that has lead to the 
acute sense of emptiness and isolation endemic to the developed countries of 
the West.81  What the alienation of socialism and capitalism share in common, 
then, is the root error of materialism.  As John Paul makes clear, however, the 
effects of this error in capitalist societies have been especially pernicious.  In 
these societies people experience a “loss of the authentic meaning of life,” 
namely, love.82  As the late Pope taught, echoing the teaching of the Council, 
love is man’s origin, his purpose, and his final calling.83  Indeed, it is only 
“through the free gift of self that man truly finds himself.”84 
Thus, the human person “is alienated if he refuses to transcend himself and 
to live the experience of selfgiving and of the formation of an authentic human 
community.”85  Likewise, “[a] society is alienated if its forms of social 
organization, production and consumption make it more difficult to offer this 
gift of self and to establish this solidarity between people.”86  Consequently, 
those who inhabit a culture of consumerism often fall prey to a kind of self-
love.  They become “ensnared in a web of false and superficial gratifications” 
and so are unable “to experience their personhood in an authentic and concrete 
 
 78. See, e.g., Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-
ENGELS READER 66 (Richard C. Tucker ed., 2d ed., 1978). 
 79. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Perhaps John Paul II’s most eloquent statement on love and its essential connection to 
human nature can be found in his first encyclical.  Redemptor Hominis, supra note 7, para. 10.  
The centrality of love in the vocation of men and women has been a theme taken up with renewed 
vigor by John Paul’s successor.  See POPE BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Deus Caritas 
Est (2005), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/ 
hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html. 
 84. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41 (explaining that through love “man finds 
again the greatness, dignity and value that belongs to his humanity”); see also Gaudium et Spes, 
supra note 57, para. 24 (“[M]an, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, 
cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.”). 
 85. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 41. 
 86. Id. 
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way.”87  Where this kind of alienation takes hold, society ceases to be a 
community of persons and instead becomes “a mass of individuals placed side 
by side, but without any mutual bonds.”88  In this setting, the isolation that 
Mikhail describes holds sway as each individual “wishes to assert himself 
independently of the other and in fact intends to make his own interests 
prevail.”89   
B. Solidarity: The Human Person and Community 
Second, Mikhail says that the antidote for the isolation that afflicts modern 
society is for people to realize the idea that Zosima grasped in the moment of 
his conversion, namely, that “every man [is] answerable for everybody and 
everything, not just for his own sins.”90  In Catholic social thought, the idea 
that men and women, across space and time, share a radical connection with 
one another is known as the principle of solidarity.91  As John Paul II explained 
in his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, solidarity is not “a feeling of vague 
compassion or shallow distress at the misfortunes” of others.92  Rather, “it is a 
firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good.”93  
Indeed, solidarity is the antithesis of the self-consuming isolation that Mikhail 
criticizes.  It reflects a “readiness . . . to ‘lose oneself’ for the sake of the other 
instead of exploiting him, and to ‘serve him’ instead of oppressing him for 
one’s own advantage.”94  Thus, solidarity is a conviction, and not a mere 
sentiment because it involves the recognition of a truth that moves the will to 
action—the truth that all of humanity is radically connected such that no 
individual can truly be free, can truly be him or herself if another is 
diminished.   
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 20. 
 89. Id. 
 90. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 365. 
 91. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para 38. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  For a useful discussion of John Paul’s use of the term “solidarity” as an attitude, 
virtue, principle, and obligation, see Patricia A. Lamoureux, Commentary on Laborem Exercens 
(On Human Work), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 389, 398–99 (Kenneth R. Himes, 
O.F.M. ed. 2005) [hereinafter MODERN CATHOLIC] and Charles E. Curren, Kenneth R. Himes, 
O.F.M., & Thomas A. Shannon, Commentary on Sollicitudo rei socialis (On Social Concern), in 
MODERN CATHOLIC, supra, at 415, 426–30. 
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C. The Insufficiency of Mere Structural Change 
Third, and relatedly, Mikhail maintains a healthy skepticism regarding the 
efficacy of changes in social structure to bring forth what he refers to in 
biblical language as “the Kingdom of God.”95  With respect to economic 
justice, for example, he insists that “[t]here is no science, no order based on the 
pursuit of material gain, that will enable men to share their goods fairly and 
respect each other’s rights.”96  The reason why such efforts will always fall 
short is that there will always be some scarcity and “men will always be 
envious of their neighbors.”97  What is needed is something more than a new 
program or method of operation.  What is needed is a change in the hearts of 
men and women.  As Mikhail bluntly states, “In order to change the world, 
man’s way of thinking must be changed.”98 
As set forth in greater detail in the section that follows,99 the Catholic 
social tradition has long held that the elimination of unjust structures and 
patterns of behavior will never be sufficient to bring about a truly just society.  
Law—including the structures that law creates and regulates—operates on the 
human person largely, although not exclusively, as an external force, an 
efficient cause.  As a coercive force, law cannot effect change from the inside.  
Standing alone, it cannot change the internal dispositions and attitudes of the 
human person. 
Echoing the teaching of his predecessors, John Paul II made clear in his 
encyclical Centesimus Annus that the transformation of society involves two 
enormous tasks.100  First, society has an obligation to remove the “specific 
structures of sin which impede the full realization of those who are in any way 
oppressed by them” and “replace them with more authentic forms of living in 
community.”101  At the same time, he warns that structural transformation is 
secondary to moral renovation.  That is, “the first and most important task [to 
be] accomplished [is] within man’s heart” in which everyone comes to 
recognize and embrace an “active commitment to [one’s] neighbor” since “no 
one can consider himself extraneous or indifferent to the lot of another member 
of the human family.”102  Solidarity should impel the human person to break 
out of the isolation that characterizes so much of modern life and work to 
remove the structures that impede the cause of justice, as well as the 
impediments that lie within his or her own heart. 
 
 95. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 365. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 366. 
 98. Id. at 365. 
 99. See infra Part II.B. 
 100. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16. 
 101. Id. para. 38. 
 102. Id. para. 51. 
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II.  STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE NEED FOR PERSONAL CONVERSION 
Beginning with Pope Leo XIII’s critique of unregulated market capitalism 
in Rerum Novarum, the Church’s social doctrine has been deeply critical of 
institutions and systems that victimize the weak and work to corrupt those with 
power.103  The “structures of sin” that haunt the men and women of today take 
many forms.104  Among the many sources of injustice that have taken 
institutional form in the modern world, the Church’s social tradition has 
specifically identified and critiqued the militarism and competition in arms 
among nations;105 the systemic mistreatment of ethnic and racial minorities;106 
the neo-colonialism that defined the immediate post-war era and the harmful 
effects of global trade on local economies and ways of life;107 the perverse 
incentives created by the legal form of the modern business corporation;108  
and the modern state as such, which often arrogates to itself responsibility over 
matters that properly rest with individuals, families, and intermediate 
institutions of free association.109 
 
 103. See Rerum Novarum, supra note 62. 
 104. See Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para 36. 
 105. POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Pacem in Terris, paras. 109–19 (1963) 
[hereinafter Pacem in Terris], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 131, 
148–50, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html; SYNOD OF BISHOPS, JUSTICE IN THE WORLD (1971), 
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 288–89 (“The arms race is a threat to 
man’s highest good, which is life; it makes poor peoples and individuals yet more miserable, 
while making richer those already powerful; it creates a continuous danger of conflagration, and 
in the case of nuclear arms, it threatens to destroy all life from the face of the earth.”); Populorum 
Progressio, supra note 60, para. 53 (calling the arms race “debilitating”); Centesimus Annus, 
supra note 16, para. 18 (bemoaning the fact that “[a]n insane arms race [has] swallowed up the 
resources needed for the development of national economies and for assistance to the less 
developed nations”). 
 106. Pacem in Terris, supra note 105, paras. 94–100; Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 
29 (“[W]ith respect to the fundamental rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether 
social or cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion, is to 
be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God’s intent.”); Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 61, 
para. 16 (condemning discrimination and calling for the “fair sharing” of a nation’s riches). 
 107. Populorum Progressio, supra note 60, para. 52 (describing “a new form of colonialism” 
as one that “exert[s] economic pressure . . . or create[s] a new power group with controlling 
influence”). 
 108. POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Quadragesimo Anno, para. 132 (1931) [hereinafter 
Quadragesimo Anno], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 16, at 42, 72 (stating 
that laws “dividing and limiting the risk of business” define the corporate form and have “given 
occasion to the most sordid license” and “reduced [the] obligation of accountability” such that 
“directors of business companies, forgetful of their trust, betray the rights of those whose savings 
they have undertaken to administer”), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html. 
 109. Id. paras. 78–79. 
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A. The Phenomenon of Social Sin 
Although many examples of “social sin” appear throughout the Catholic 
social tradition, the idea itself did not receive a thorough exposition and 
conceptual development until the pontificate of John Paul II.  Specifically, the 
concept of “social sin” and “structures of sin” was the subject of some 
sustained reflection both in John Paul’s 1984 post-synodal apostolic 
exhortation Reconciliatio et Paenitentia110 and his 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo 
Rei Socialis.111 
What stands out in John Paul’s analysis is a recognition that unjust 
structures exist in the world which ties these structures to the personal sins of 
individuals.  Thus, according to the Pope, “it is not out of place to speak of 
‘structures of sin’” so long as it is understood that such institutions and 
methods of behavior are always “rooted in personal sin, and thus always linked 
to the concrete acts of individuals.”112  Indeed, “[s]in, in the proper sense, is 
always a personal act . . . an act of freedom on the part of an individual person 
and not properly of a group or community.”113  Thus, the Church rejects the 
notion that injustice is present in the world simply because of the existence of 
“some vague entity or anonymous collectivity such as the situation, the system, 
society, structures or institutions.”114  As John Paul makes clear, it is 
individuals “who introduce these structures, consolidate them and make them 
difficult to remove.”115 Because the exercise of human freedom is always 
“conditioned by the social structure in which [a person] lives, by the education 
he has received and by his environment,”116 when these malignant social forms 
go unchallenged, they “grow stronger, spread, and become the source of other 
sins, and so influence people’s behavior.”117 
Thus, the Pope sees the relationship between structures of sin and 
particular sinful acts as dynamic and mutually reinforcing.  On the one hand, 
unjust institutions and social phenomena are themselves the “result of the 
 
 110. POPE JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION Reconciliatio et 
Paenitentia (1984) [hereinafter Reconciliatio et Paenitentia], available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_02121984_reconciliatio-et-
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teaching.  See Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of Social Sin in Its Thomistic Roots, 7 J. MARKETS 
& MORALITY 363 (2004). 
 112. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para. 36. 
 113. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 69, para. 36. 
 116. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 38. 
 117. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 34, para. 36. 
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accumulation and concentration of many personal sins.”118 Indeed, these 
structures continue to exist precisely because individuals deliberately choose to 
seek their own advantage at the expense of others, or by acting with complicity 
or indifference in the face of evil.119  On the other hand, these structures 
encourage unjust behavior by creating the aura of normalcy and legitimacy.  
As a consequence, “the moral conscience of many people becomes seriously 
clouded,” the difference between right and wrong is obscured, and people 
experience a “loss of the sense of sin.”120  Thus, a given social structure—such 
as a system of short-term economic incentives that discourage employers from 
paying workers a living wage, or a culture of racial discrimination deeply 
rooted in the practices and customs of a given community—is not in itself a 
primary cause of moral evil since “an institution, a structure, society itself . . . 
is not in itself the subject of moral acts.”121  Instead, the subject of all moral 
action is the human person who remains free to choose how to live his life 
within the limits of the circumstances that surround him.  Accordingly, “[a]t 
the heart of every situation of sin are always to be found sinful people.”122 
B. Papal and Conciliar Teaching on the Limitations of Structural Reform 
Although the Church has long advocated the elimination of unjust 
structures, customs, and modes of behavior, Catholic social teaching has never 
held that structural reform by itself will ever be sufficient to bring about the 
creation of a just society.  Indeed, humanity’s fallen nature and the proclivity 
of men and women to pursue their own advantage at the expense of others 
suggests—and human experience confirms—that once the current unjust 
structures are swept away they will be replaced by new and perhaps more 
virulent social forms of oppression and exploitation.123  Thus, in advocating for 
 
 118. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. para. 18. 
 121. Id. para. 16. 
 122. Id. 
 123. It is precisely for this reason that, contrary to the suggestions of some critics, compare 
Leonid Kishkovsky, An Ecumenical Afterword to A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: 
ESSAYS ON “RERUM NOVARUM” AND NINE OTHER KEY DOCUMENTS 177, 179–81 (George 
Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1991) [hereinafter A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT] 
(citing Father Alexander Schmemann and arguing that the Church in the West incorrectly saw 
itself as “an institution that assists in the achievement in this world of human dreams and 
aspirations” thus lending support to “secular eschatologies” and “secular utopias” and claiming 
that the Church in the East can help recover “the eschatological perspective of Christianity” that 
eschews all ideology), Catholic social thought is not tinged with utopianism.  Indeed, it views the 
world through the clear lens of Christian realism, a lens which plainly sees human nature as fallen 
but redeemed through the power of Christ and his cross.  As an “expert in humanity,” the Church 
knows that every utopian vision of earthly paradise is doomed to failure.  Pope Paul VI, Address 
Before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 4, 1965) (internal quotation omitted).  
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change in the social order, the Church has always championed another, deeper 
kind of reform—a reform of the human heart. 
This dual concern for structural change and personal reform has been a 
consistent theme in Catholic social thought from its inception.  For example, in 
Rerum Novarum, Pope Leo XIII argued on behalf of the right of laborers to 
work under humane conditions and to receive a just wage, and against the 
exploitation of workers under unconscionable wage contracts.124  At the same 
time, Leo makes clear that “the chief good that society can possess is 
virtue.”125  Although Leo clearly sees a role for the state in relieving misery 
and achieving just relations among men, he insists that “no human expedients 
will ever make up for the devotedness and self sacrifice of Christian 
charity.”126  Here, as William Murphy has noted, Leo not only makes clear the 
bond “between the commitment to social justice and the necessity of the 
virtuous life,” he also upholds “the life of charity as the ultimate flowering of 
the search for justice.”127 
In his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI made even more 
explicit the need for a genuine moral renovation to accompany the reform of 
social institutions and practices.  Indeed, Pius insisted that all efforts aimed at 
the “reconstruction and perfection of social order can surely in no wise be 
brought to realization without reform of morality.”128  Specifically, Pius 
contended that a truly meaningful “social reconstruction . . . must be [preceded 
by] a renewal of the Christian spirit” and that, in the absence of such renewal, 
“all our efforts will be futile and our social edifice will be built not upon a 
rock, but upon shifting sand.”129 
John XXIII devoted his encyclical Pacem in Terris to the subject of peace 
among nations.130  This reflection took place in the shadow of an escalating 
arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as an often-
bloody competition for allies among developing nations.131  Indeed, John 
issued the encyclical only a few months after the Cuban Missile Crisis when 
the superpowers and the world came perilously close to the calamity of nuclear 
 
Moreover, Catholic social thought is not an ideology and the Church has no concrete model of 
action to put forth.  Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 43.  At the same time, the Church 
looks to the future with confident hope knowing that within the hearts of men and women lies the 
seed of genuine cultural renewal and societal transformation. 
 124. Rerum Novarum, supra note 62, paras. 34–35. 
 125. Id. para. 34. 
 126. Id. para. 30. 
 127. William Murphy, Rerum Novarum, in A CENTURY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, 
supra note 123, at 1, 24. 
 128. Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 108, para. 97. 
 129. Id. para. 127. 
 130. Pacem in Terris, supra note 105. 
 131. Id. para. 109–13. 
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conflagration.  John’s letter contains many recommendations for structural 
reform among nations and within the international order.  These include the 
universal recognition and enforcement of human rights, support for democratic 
forms of government, calls for disarmament, and the establishment of an 
effective world authority.132  Even if these sorts of reforms are implemented, 
however, John insists that structural changes will only go so far: “The world 
will never be the dwelling place of peace, till peace has found a home in the 
heart of each and every man, till every man preserves in himself the order 
ordained by God to be preserved.”133 
Building on the work of Pope John and his predecessors, the Second 
Vatican Council offered a similar diagnosis, and insisted on the need for both 
structural change and moral renewal.  In Gaudium et Spes the Council fathers 
noted that “the disturbances which so frequently occur in the social order result 
in part from the natural tensions of economic, political and social forms” but 
that “at a deeper level they flow from man’s pride and selfishness, which 
contaminate even the social sphere.”134  Thus, according to the Council, the 
problems that beset the modern world are not the result of the mere existence 
of certain unjust “social forms.”135  Because justice is a virtue that describes 
the dynamic of relations among people, it cannot be achieved through the 
simple, mechanical removal of an unjust “part.”136  Admittedly, the depravity 
of some customs, methods of operation, and structures may be so profound that 
their existence precludes the possibility of a truly just social order, and the 
presence of these institutional forms in social life may well create “new 
inducements to sin.”137  Nevertheless, structures, standing alone, are impotent.  
The ultimate source of the injustice that afflicts the world is the wrongful 
exercise of human freedom by individuals.  Thus, the creation of a truly just 
social order will require more than simply the reform or removal of the 
structures of sin.  Instead, as the Council noted, it will require the reform of 
every human heart through “strenuous efforts and the assistance of grace.”138 
Following the Council, Paul VI expressed a similar skepticism regarding 
the likely success of structural changes, standing alone.  Paul’s teaching is 
distinguished, however, in that it is set forth in deeply personal, indeed, 
existential terms.  Paul insists that the cause of social renewal cannot be 
confined to the reform of institutions: “It is not enough,” he says, “to recall 
principles, state intentions, point to crying injustice and utter prophetic 
 
 132. Id. paras. 11–27, 67–79, 109–19, 130–45. 
 133. Id. para. 165. 
 134. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 25. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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denunciations.”139  Indeed, “[i]t is too easy to throw back on others 
responsibility for injustice, if at the same time one does not realize how each 
one shares in it personally, and how personal conversion is needed first.”140  
Thus, every person must “examine himself, to see what he has done up to now, 
and what he ought to do.”141 
Even more than his predecessors, John Paul stressed the limitations of 
merely bureaucratic and institutional reforms in effecting authentic social 
change.  As someone who lived through and indeed resisted both the Nazi 
occupation of Poland and the ensuing Communist dictatorship, John Paul was 
someone well acquainted with the most elaborate and malevolent structures of 
sin imaginable.  Accordingly, a call for thorough-going institutional reform in 
various aspects of social life was a common theme throughout John Paul’s 
social magisterium.  At the same time, John Paul knew, far better than his 
adversaries, that in many areas of life, law is unable to effect change precisely 
because the coercive power of the state cannot reach into the recesses of the 
human heart.  Despite its seeming omnipotence, law cannot make human 
beings act with genuine charity toward one another, nor can it make someone 
believe that which his or her conscience and reason refuse to accept as true.142  
Moreover, when it attempts to change that which it cannot, law becomes a 
cruel caricature of itself by destroying the very subject it was designed to 
serve, namely, the human person.  As one cognizant of law’s limits, John Paul 
was also mindful of the fact that “even when such a situation can be changed in 
its structural and institutional aspects by the force of law . . . the change [often] 
proves to be incomplete, of short duration and ultimately vain and 
ineffective—not to say counterproductive if the people directly or indirectly 
responsible for that situation are not converted.”143 
III.  LAW AND THE PRIORITY OF CULTURE 
John Paul’s appreciation for the limits of law is evidenced not only in his 
treatment of the “structures of sin,” but also in his analysis of “culture,” an 
analysis which appears as a recurring theme throughout his pontificate.  The 
fathers of the Second Vatican Council made “culture” a center point of the 
Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium 
 
 139. Octogesima Adveniens, supra note 61, para. 48. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Cf. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Dignitatis Humanae Personae, para. 1 (1965) [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae], reprinted in THE 
DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, at 675 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., & Joseph Gallagher trans., 1966) 
(“The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the 
mind at once quietly and with power.”), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ 
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. 
 143. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16. 
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et Spes.144  Unfortunately, their use of the word was marked by a certain 
“terminological looseness.”145  Indeed, despite the frequent reference made to 
“culture” throughout the document, the Council fathers “nonetheless failed to 
identify precisely what they meant with each usage of the term.”146  Here John 
Paul’s thoughtful treatment of “culture” supplies a useful tonic for the careless 
overuse of this word. 
A. John Paul II and the Meaning of “Culture” 
According to John Paul, culture can be found at the center of society and 
the experience of every person because of the answers it provides to life’s most 
basic questions.  That is, the human person is a being who cannot avoid 
confronting certain questions regarding the nature of his or her existence: 
“Who am I?  Where have I come from and where am I going?  Why is there 
evil?  What is there after this life?”147  Indeed, for John Paul, “[n]o one can 
escape from the fundamental questions: What must I do?  How do I distinguish 
good from evil?”148  Precisely because “[n]o-one can avoid this 
 
 144. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, paras. 53–62. 
 145. See TRACEY ROWLAND, CULTURE AND THE THOMIST TRADITION AFTER VATICAN II 18 
(2003). 
 146. Id. at 20. 
 147. Fides et Ratio, supra note 13, para. 1 (emphasis omitted). 
 148. Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, para. 2 (emphasis omitted).  In presenting these 
questions as central to the “mystery of man,” John Paul was again echoing the teaching of the 
Second Vatican Council.  Accord Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 10 (noting “the number 
constantly swells of the people who raise the most basic questions or recognize them with a new 
sharpness:  What is man?  What is this sense of sorrow, of evil, of death, which continues to exist 
despite so much progress?  What purpose have these victories purchased at so high a cost?  What 
can man offer to society, what can he expect from it?  What follows this earthly life?”); SECOND 
VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHURCH TO 
NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS Nostra Aetate, para. 1 (1965), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTS OF 
VATICAN II, at 660 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., & Joseph Gallagher trans., 1966) (referring to 
“the unsolved riddles of the human condition, which today, even as in former times, deeply stir 
the hearts of men: What is man?  What is the meaning [and] aim of our life?  What is moral good 
[and] what [is] sin?  Whence suffering and what purpose does it serve?  Which is the road to true 
happiness?  What are death, judgment and retribution after death?  What, finally, is that ultimate 
inexpressible mystery which encompasses our existence: whence do we come, and where are we 
going?”), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/ 
vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html. 
  For both the Pope and the Council, and indeed the Church throughout history, “the 
decisive answer to every one of man’s questions, his religious and moral questions in particular, 
is given by Jesus Christ, or rather is Jesus Christ himself, as the Second Vatican Council recalls: 
‘In fact, it is only in the mystery of the Word incarnate that light is shed on the mystery of man.’”  
Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, para. 2 (quoting Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 22).  
Thus, “[t]he man who wishes to understand himself thoroughly—and not just in accordance with 
immediate, partial, often superficial, and even illusory standards and measures of his being—he 
must with his unrest, uncertainty and even his weakness and sinfulness, with his life and death, 
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questioning,”149 “all men and women . . . are in some sense philosophers” in 
that, “one way or [an]other, they shape a comprehensive vision and an answer 
to the question of life’s meaning; and in the light of this they interpret their 
own life’s course and regulate their behaviour.”150  At the same time, the 
human person is a social animal.  He or she does not formulate the answers to 
these questions in isolation.  Instead, “[f]rom birth . . . [men and women] are 
immersed in traditions which give them not only a language and a cultural 
formation but also a range of truths in which they believe almost 
instinctively.”151 
A culture, then, constitutes the response that a given people have to these 
fundamental questions, a response that is constantly being revised and worked 
out over time.  It is expressed not only through the customs and traditions of a 
people, but through their language, history, art, commerce, and politics.  
Indeed, “[a]ll human activity takes place within a culture and interacts with 
culture.”152  At the same time, a given culture reveals its deepest identity in the 
position it takes “towards the fundamental events of life, such as birth, love, 
work and death” as well as “the mystery of God.”153  Thus, “[d]ifferent 
cultures are basically different ways of facing the question of the meaning of 
personal existence.”154 
As such, every culture is, in essence, a normative and didactic enterprise.  
It indicates what is desirable and permissible within a given society.  It 
instructs both the observer and the participant as to how they ought to act.  
Indeed, as Joseph Pieper reminds us, and as the etymology of the word 
confirms, at the heart of every “culture” is a “cult” in the sense of religious 
devotion.155  That is, a culture is a societal answer to the question of value.  
Every culture renders a whole series of judgments as to what is truly important 
in life.  In the norms implicit in the practices it supports and encourages, every 
culture identifies what is really worth valuing, what is worth the sacrifice and 
effort necessary to pursue and possess that which is most prized.  Thus, in 
 
draw near to Christ.”  Redemptor Hominis, supra note 7, para. 10.  Although it is entirely 
appropriate to give cultural expression to this fundamentally Christocentric perspective, the 
Church believes that to give legal expression to this truth in the form of coercive laws would 
violate the dignity of the human person.  See Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 142.  Thus, 
although Christ is the answer to all the questions of the human heart, he is the answer that people 
must come to freely on their own.  The state cannot force anyone to come to this truth, to embrace 
Christ, without at the same time engaging in conduct that is deeply sinful and offensive to God. 
 149. Fides et Ratio, supra note 13, para. 27. 
 150. Id. para. 30. 
 151. Id. para. 31. 
 152. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 51. 
 153. Id. para. 24. 
 154. Id. 
 155. JOSEPH PIEPER, LEISURE THE BASIS OF CULTURE 76–77 (Alexander Dru trans., 
Pantheon Books 1952). 
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ways which are sometimes subtle and sometimes overt, but which are always 
readily understood, a given culture defines that which is truly deserving of 
worship as the highest good to be attained. 
B. Identifying the Salient Features of American Culture 
Again, the answers that a culture proposes to the fundamental questions 
and events of life are not made in the abstract.  Instead, they are made present 
in the most mundane and concrete decisions of life.  As John Paul makes clear, 
“[a] given culture reveals its overall understanding of life through the choices 
it makes in production and consumption.”156  Thus, looking at the United 
States, the answers proposed by our culture to these basic questions can be 
found in such things as the size and location of the homes that people choose to 
build,157 in the number of hours they devote to work and to leisure,158 in the 
kinds of cars they choose to drive, 159 in how they regard the durability and 
disposability of both goods and packaging,160 in the kinds of meals they choose 
to enjoy,161 and in their use of resources as basic as water.162  Plainly, the 
 
 156. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36. 
 157. ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE 
OF THE AMERICAN DREAM x, 4 (2000) (lamenting the “self–destructive [growth]” of suburban 
sprawl, which the authors consider a “soulless [collection of] subdivisions, . . . strip shopping 
centers, . . . [and] office parks”); Fred A. Bernstein, Are McMansions Going Out of Style?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, §11, at 1 (reporting that the size of the average American house rose from 
about 1,500 square feet in 1970 to over 2,300 square feet in 2001, but that the trend for larger 
houses is abating). 
 158. Alberto Alesina et al., Work and Leisure in the United States and Europe: Why So 
Different?, 20 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 1, 1 (2006) (arguing that Europeans work 
more than Americans and take more vacations largely as a result of European labor market 
regulations of the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s). 
 159. See KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: SUVS—THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS 
VEHICLES AND HOW THEY GOT THAT WAY (2002) (highlighting the safety and environmental 
concerns of sport utility vehicles and proposing various regulatory and other incentives to 
increase safety standards or drive SUVs off the market). 
 160. See HEATHER ROGERS, GONE TOMORROW: THE HIDDEN LIFE OF GARBAGE 2 (2005) 
(arguing that Americans produce the most waste of any country in the world and pointing out the 
problems with wasteful packing, recycling programs, and flawed landfills and incinerators).  But 
see Kirk Johnson, Throwaway Societies of Yesteryear: Past Decades Were the Golden Ages for 
Waste, Scientist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at B1 (reporting one study finding that New 
York City’s output of garbage per person is decreasing over the course of the century). 
 161. ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 
9 (2001) (discussing the “diverse influences of fast food . . . on [the] distinctively American way 
of viewing the world” and arguing that consumers can positively affect social and economic 
trends such as obesity, unsafe working conditions, and the domestic agriculture industry by 
choosing not to purchase fast food). 
 162. EPA, CLEANER WATER THROUGH CONSERVATION (1995), available at 
http://www.epa.gov (suggesting different methods of using water efficiently, thereby lowering the 
high demand for water in the United States that can contribute to water source pollution). 
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identity of a given culture is not confined to the ideas proposed by its writers 
and artists.  At the same time, the answers that our culture provides to life’s 
questions can also be gleaned from the music,163 television, films,164 and other 
forms of entertainment165 that Americans produce and consume. 
These choices give some indication of what Americans consider important, 
what it is that they believe is truly deserving of sacrifice, even worship.  
Plainly, any attempt to summarize something as complicated as American 
culture risks falling into caricature.  General descriptions of vast subjects must, 
of necessity, forgo nuance.  Having said that, it would not be wrong to say that 
the culture reflected in the choices made by most Americans is defined by a set 
of “consumer attitudes and life-styles” that celebrate “having” over “being.”166  
Indeed, the description that Father Zosima’s friend offers of a society in which 
“the more goods [one] accumulates, the deeper [one] sinks into suicidal 
impotence” is chilling in its familiarity.167  That is, although Americans have 
often demonstrated a remarkable sense of generosity, especially in times of 
crisis,168 the choices we make day to day, under ordinary circumstances, tend 
to reflect a kind of “self-love which leads to an unbridled affirmation of self-
interest,” a self-love that often frustrates the demands of justice and the 
requirements of the common good.169  Thus, the “cult” at the heart of 
 
 163. Steven C. Martino et al., Exposure to Degrading Versus Nondegrading Music Lyrics and 
Sexual Behavior Among Youth, 118 PEDIATRICS 430 (2006) (arguing that the degrading sexual 
lyrics prevalent in popular music contribute to the problem of early and risky sexual activity in 
the United States). 
 164. See KID STUFF: MARKETING SEX AND VIOLENCE TO AMERICA’S CHILDREN (Diane 
Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti eds., 2003) (concluding that exposure to entertainment containing 
explicit sex and violence negatively affects the social and psychological development of 
adolescents, and urging parents to counter negative media messages by discussing them with 
children). 
 165. See THOMAS BARKER & MARJIE BRITZ, JOKERS WILD: LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2000) (conducting an examination of legalized gambling in the United 
States and its effects on individuals and communities); PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET (2001) (urging more effective law enforcement against 
child pornography and suggesting a prohibition of the newsgroups and message boards where the 
child pornography subculture communicates); PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS, INC.: 100 YEARS OF 
SPORTS BUSINESS (2004) (describing the growth of the sports entertainment industry and 
analyzing modern income sources and sports marketing techniques). 
 166. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36 (emphasis omitted). 
 167. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 19, at 366. 
 168. See Anna M. Tinsley, Outpouring of Donations After Katrina Largest Ever, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 2006, at A11 (stating the Americans gave $4.2 billion for Katrina relief, 
exceeding the previous record of $3 billion given after the 9/11 terrorist attacks). 
 169. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 17. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] JOHN PAUL II, THE STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 343 
American “culture” may be described as a cult of the individual, a cult of the 
autonomous self.170 
C. The Relationship Between Law and Culture 
John Paul recognizes that people must enjoy a large measure of freedom in 
the exercise of culture.171  Because culture is a vast, decentralized phenomenon 
that is expressed only over time through the accretion of numerous individual 
decisions involving a multiplicity of activities, in a society that values 
freedom,172 law is ill-suited to bring about a thorough-going cultural 
transformation.  Instead, according to John Paul, what is urgently needed is the 
cultural work of education “including the education of consumers in the 
responsible use of their power of choice [and] the formation of a strong sense 
of responsibility among producers.”173  By “education,” the Pope does not 
mean a formal system of indoctrination or the imposition of an ideology.174  
The education that must take place is a matter of persuasion, not coercion.175  
That is, it must be freely accepted by those to whom it is proposed. 
As such, the change in society that the Pope has in mind will not come 
about principally through a change in the law.  To repeat, John Paul 
acknowledges the need to alter “the established structures of power which 
 
 170. John Paul believes that this worship of the self is the consequence of the separation of 
freedom from truth.  See, e.g., Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, paras. 32, 35 (describing certain 
currents in modern thought in which “[t]he individual conscience is accorded the status of a 
supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible decisions about 
good and evil” and that the freedom to “create values” goes beyond a claim to “moral autonomy” 
and “actually amount[s] to an absolute sovereignty”); Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 19 
(stating that the contemporary understanding of freedom “exalts the isolated individual in an 
absolute way” and “ends up by becoming the freedom of ‘the strong’ against the weak who have 
no choice but to submit”).  Thus, at the heart of his critique of this radical liberalism is a flawed 
anthropology, that is, a loss of “the truth about man.”  Veritatis Splendor, supra note 17, para. 31. 
 171. Cf. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 57, para. 59 (stating that “culture . . . has constant need 
of a just liberty in order to develop” and that “[i]t is not [public authority’s] function to determine 
the character of the civilization”). 
 172. It is not by coincidence that the tumultuous period in Chinese history in the 1960s and 
1970s under Mao Zedong is known as the “Cultural Revolution,” nor is it a coincidence that the 
Chinese Communist authorities in power did not value individual freedom and so were quite 
content to effect the cultural changes they sought through the force of law.  See generally THE 
CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY (Joseph W. Esherick et al. eds., 2006). 
 173. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36. 
 174. Cf. id. para. 46 (insisting that Christian truth is not an ideology in that it “does not . . . 
imprison changing socio-political realities in a rigid schema”). 
 175. Cf. Pope John Paul II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Redemptoris Missio, para. 39 (1990) (“The 
Church proposes; she imposes nothing.  She respects individuals and cultures, and she honors the 
sanctuary of conscience.”) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio_en.html. 
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today govern societies.”176  Where justice is at stake, law has an indispensable 
role to play in the regulation of social life.177  But law is itself a cultural 
artifact.  Law does not stand outside of culture but emerges from within it.  At 
the same time, law influences the very culture that produced it, causing that 
culture to develop in ways that otherwise would not have taken place.  Thus, 
the relationship between law and culture is complex insofar as culture is both 
generative of and responsive to law.  As Francis George has noted, “[l]aw 
contributes massively to the formation of culture [and] culture influences and 
shapes law” such that the two “stand in a mutually informing, formative, and 
reinforcing relationship.”178 
At the same time, however, culture and law are not equal players in the 
formation of social norms.  Instead, as George Weigel has written, 
summarizing an important theme from John Paul’s pontificate, culture enjoys a 
kind of priority “over politics and economics as the engine of historical 
change.”179  First, culture enjoys a kind of logical priority over law.180  That is, 
although every legal system is the intellectual product of some culture, not 
every culture generates a system of laws.181  Admittedly, when a society attains 
a certain size and level of complexity, informal social norms are often 
superseded by laws that have been formally adopted.  Moreover, many of the 
values and beliefs that make up the culture typically receive some juridical 
expression.  This need not, however, be the case.  No society can ever exist in 
the absence of values, that is, without culture, but a society can exist 
independent of any formal system of law. 
Second, and relatedly, law is not, as a logical matter, necessary in order to 
achieve the social goal for which it is established, namely, justice.  Strictly 
speaking, the laws of a given society are not the primary cause of it being 
 
 176. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 58. 
 177. See, e.g., id. para. 36 (referring to “the necessary intervention by public authorities”). 
 178. Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 9 (2003). 
 179. George Weigel, John Paul II and the Priority of Culture, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1998, at 
19. 
 180. See S.L. Hurley, Objectivity and Disagreement, in MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY: A 
TRIBUTE TO J.L. MACKIE 55 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985). 
In general, to say that one concept or set of concepts is logically prior to another is to say 
that the latter is properly accounted for and understood in terms of the former and not vice 
versa; someone could grasp the prior concept without grasping the concept understood in 
terms of it, but not vice versa.  To deny a claim of logical priority is to deny that someone 
could correctly understand one without understanding the other. 
Id. 
 181. Here, I disagree with Cardinal George’s claim that, in the “complex dialectical 
relationship” between law and culture, “[n]either comes first; neither comes last.”  See George, 
supra note 178, at 9.  George’s claim is correct insofar as it is limited to the practical, temporal 
order.  For the reasons set forth above, however, on the conceptual level, culture enjoys a kind of 
logical priority over law. 
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either just or unjust.182  Instead, what makes a society just in the first instance 
is that it is composed of just people—of men and women who desire justice 
and who are willing to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure that justice 
characterizes their life together.183  Indeed, aside from the need for 
coordination,184 a society made up of perfectly just individuals would have no 
 
 182. This claim is in need of some clarification.  It is true that, as a primary matter, the laws 
of a given society do not make the society either just or unjust.  Nevertheless, it is also true that a 
society composed of perfectly just individuals would still suffer from injustice if any one of its 
laws repudiated the principles of justice.  Indeed, this would be true even if the unjust law in 
question did not affect the conduct of those whom it governed.  For example, a state composed of 
perfectly just individuals that chose to repeal its rape statute while maintaining other criminal 
prohibitions against acts such as murder, assault and burglary, would be guilty of injustice even if 
no one was victimized by rape following the statute’s repeal.  This selective omission would, in a 
soft but unmistakably clear voice, tell people what is and is not acceptable conduct.  Likewise, a 
state that enacted a statute that permitted whites to enslave non-whites would be unjust even if no 
one attempted to practice slavery.  That is, even if the law was in effect dead-letter—the sole 
rhetorical remnant of a racist past long forgotten—it would still impair the full realization of 
justice in the society by continuing to teach the superiority of some individuals over others.  
Indeed, for the state to continue to exercise its teaching capacity in this manner—the official state 
endorsement of injustice—would harm the common good, even if the message was ignored by 
everyone.  In the same way, a lie is harmful for being told, even if no one believes it.  By contrast, 
the state could teach a quite different lesson through repeal, a lesson not soon forgotten by the 
state’s constituents.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional 
state laws making interracial marriage illegal); Jeff Amy, Voters Strike Ban on Interracial 
Marriage, MOBILE REGISTER, Nov. 8, 2000, at 24A (describing the results of the state 
constitutional referendum that voided a portion of the Alabama constitution that had been 
ineffective since the Loving decision). 
 183. The mere fact that a society has adopted laws that are just does not mean that its 
members will exude justice.  After all, individuals and groups may violate the law with impunity, 
perhaps undetected, or the law may go unenforced by the state.  Moreover, because justice is a 
virtue of the individual, part of his or her constitution, it can only be acquired through the active 
assimilation of the person. Thus, in this sense, a person cannot be “made” just simply by being 
subject to just laws because a person is not “made” in the same way that a chair is “made” out of 
a block of wood.  Nevertheless, a person who is subject to just laws may acquire the virtue of 
justice through the routine of right conduct.  See 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 
Pt. I–II, Q. 92, Art. 2, at 1002 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 
1946) (1920) (“From being accustomed to avoid evil and fulfil what is good, through fear of 
punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one’s own accord.  
Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.”).  Indeed, a person can 
become just by doing what is just, repeatedly, within a given situation, such that the decision to 
do what is right becomes a matter of habit.  See also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105b 
9–12 (W.D. Ross trans.), reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 956 (Richard McKeon 
ed., 1963).  The great Jesuit poet Gerard Manley Hopkins beautifully captured precisely this point 
in one of his most famous verses: “I say more: the just man justices;/Keeps grace: that keeps all 
his goings graces.”  Gerard Manley Hopkins, As kingfishers catch fire, in GERARD MANLEY 
HOPKINS: THE MAJOR WORKS 129 (Catherine Phillips ed., 2002). 
 184. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231–33 (1980) (arguing that, 
absent unanimity, there is a need for some political authority to coordinate matters with respect to 
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need of law since no one would violate the rights of any other person.185  
Everyone in such a society would do what is right as a matter of habit and 
desire and not out of compunction brought on by fear of the state.186  As Grant 
Gilmore observed, echoing both St. Paul and the Federalist Papers, “The 
better the society, the less law there will be.  In Heaven there will be no 
law . . . .  The worse the society, the more law there will be.  In Hell there will 
be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.”187  From 
this perspective the existence of law represents a kind of failure.  Laws are a 
second-best corrective that hope to make up for the absence of rightful conduct 
in the first instance.  As such, however, law is necessary in every society 
composed of fallible human beings who, perhaps despite their better instincts, 
often fail to render to one another that which is their due.  In these imperfect 
societies—in every society known throughout history—the law exists in order 
to teach, to encourage, and to restore the order—the just order—that defines 
the just society.  Thus, as a practical matter, law and culture are virtually 
inseparable. 
Third, and perhaps most important of all, culture is, as an empirical matter, 
vastly more important than law in shaping the everyday lives of people.  
Indeed, this influence includes the immediate, practical decision as to whether 
or not to obey the law.  This decision is often based on the perceived justice of 
the law as well as the perception that it will be fairly applied to different 
 
the management of natural resources, the use of force, and the resolution of competing rights and 
claims regarding the common good); ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 107–
08 (1999) (admitting that in a society of “perfectly morally upright beings” laws against murder 
and the like would not be necessary, but insisting that since “the moral point of law is to serve the 
good of people as they are” such laws are necessary and proper and that they require the exercise 
of authority to translate “natural principles of justice and political morality into rules and 
principles of positive law”). 
 185. This captures something of what St. Paul means when he declares that Christians are not 
subject to the specific provisions of the Mosaic law.  Romans 6:14 (“For sin shall not have 
dominion over you, for you are not under the law, but under grace.”); Galatians 5:18 (“But if you 
are led by the Spirit, then you are not under the law.”).  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“But what is government 
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?  If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary.”). 
 186. Even if the law of a given society was perfectly just and its institutions well-ordered, the 
life of the society might nevertheless be marked by grave injustice.  Just laws and just social 
structures do not and cannot ensure a just society since, as a fundamental matter, justice is a virtue 
of character that one exemplifies in his or her relationships with others.  See generally Robert 
John Araujo, S.J., Realizing a Mission: Teaching Justice as “Right Relationship,” 74 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 591 (2000).  Accordingly, what matters most in assessing the presence or absence of 
justice within a given society is the content of the actions taken by its members in regard to one 
another. 
 187. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977). 
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individuals.188  Many of the social phenomena criticized by John Paul have a 
legal dimension.  Various legal doctrines and institutions support their 
existence.189  Nevertheless, the legal nature of these phenomena is not primary.  
Rather, they come into existence and are sustained in the legal and political 
order because of some set of antecedent values that subsists in the culture. 
Ultimately, the priority of culture over law means that “[t]he real 
responsibility” for unjust structures as well as particular sinful acts “lies with 
individuals.”190  Thus, John Paul insists that “the first and most important task 
is accomplished within man’s heart.”191  Only by reaching the human heart will 
the human person come to see him or herself less “as a producer or consumer 
of goods” and more “as a subject who produces and consumes in order to 
live.”192  Only then will individuals no longer regard “the production and 
consumption of goods . . . [as] the centre of social life and society’s only 
value.”193  Only then can new “life-styles”194 come about “in which the quest 
for truth, beauty, goodness and communion with others for the sake of the 
common growth are the factors which determine consumer choices, savings 
and investments.”195  Only then will men and women feel free to turn away 
from the cult of the autonomous self and embrace that which is truly deserving 
of worship. 
In sum, we can say that John Paul’s concern for the elimination of unjust 
social structures is always tempered by the recognition that such actions will 
not, as an ultimate matter in the temporal order,196 bring about a world of true 
peace.  Although he supports the use of law to dismantle the structures of sin, 
John Paul believes that such actions will always be insufficient.  New 
 
 188. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
 189. For example, the market and its attendant consumerism and materialism are supported by 
a number of legal doctrines and institutions such as freedom of contract, the right to own and 
dispose of private property, and the modern business corporation.  For John Paul’s criticism of 
the market and the consumerist mentality see supra notes 69–89 and accompanying text. 
 190. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, supra note 110, para. 16. 
 191. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 51. 
 192. Id. para. 39. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. para. 36.  The term appears throughout John Paul’s discussion of cultural 
transformation in Centesimus Annus.  See id. para. 52 (stating that fostering the standing of the 
poor in the world economy “may mean making important changes in established life-styles, in 
order to limit the waste of environmental and human resources, thus enabling every individual 
and all the peoples of the earth to have a sufficient share of those resources”); id. para. 58 
(helping the poor will require “above all a change of life-styles, of models of production and 
consumption” ). 
 195. Centesimus Annus, supra note 16, para. 36. 
 196. From the Church’s point of view, true ultimacy goes beyond time and consists of 
participation in the life of God throughout eternity.  See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
§§ 1023–1029 (2d ed. 1997). 
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structures will always rise to take their place as the world is always inventing 
new pathologies from which it must recover.  Indeed, legal solutions to social 
problems will always be merely partial solutions.  Legal actions will always 
lack what is necessary for genuine social transformation because, in the first 
instance, man is a cultural being, not a legal being.  The ordering of his life de 
facto precedes the ordering of his life de jure.  Indeed, culture is a more 
powerful force in directing the lives of individuals and groups than is law. 197  
Accordingly, John Paul contends that the creation of a just society requires the 
support of a culture dedicated to justice and solidarity among all people.  Thus, 
like Father Zosima’s guest, John Paul insists that profound social change will 
not take place without a conversion of the human heart.  But what, if any, role 
does law have in bringing about such a change? 
IV.  MODESTY AND MORALISM: THE SKEEL-STUNTZ THESIS 
In their recent essay, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, David 
Skeel and William Stuntz argue that law, properly understood, should be 
modest both in the scope of its application and in the goals that it seeks to 
realize in social life.198  Echoing the thought of many others on the subject,199 
Skeel and Stuntz contend that in order to be law a rule must possess certain 
qualities.  Indeed, the very notion of “the rule of law” holds that a legal rule 
“must define the line between behavior that is subject to legal penalty and 
behavior that isn’t”200 in a way that is “reasonably clear.”201  Moreover, the 
rule of law demands some basic level of equality among persons in that “the 
law must treat violators at least roughly the same”202 regardless of their social 
or economic station in life.  The requirements of equality, clarity, and 
specificity help to guarantee that the application of law is not simply a matter 
of “discretionary choice” on the part of officials who enforce the law.203  
Indeed, Skeel and Stuntz posit that “[i]f there is one key condition that must be 
satisfied for a country to call itself free, it is that no one can be thrown in 
 
 197. Here again, Karol Wojtyla’s own experiences in life—as a young man in Poland under 
Nazi occupation and as a priest and bishop confronting Communism—confirmed the fact that the 
coercive power of the state is unable to effect truly profound and lasting social change when a 
people, bolstered by the support of an authentic culture, choose to exercise their freedom in 
defiance of the ruling powers.  In each case, a totalitarian regime was unable to defeat the cultural 
identity, political aspirations, and moral sense of the Polish nation.  For an account of Karol 
Wojtyla’s experiences during these periods in Polish history, see generally WEIGEL, supra note 2. 
 198. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20. 
 199. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 184, at 270–73; LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
33–94 (1969). 
 200. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 809. 
 201. Id. at 815. 
 202. Id. at 810. 
 203. Id. at 809. 
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prison for no better reason than because it pleased some government official to 
put him there.”204 
Skeel and Stuntz find additional support for the rule of law in “an unlikely 
subject: Christian theology.”205  Indeed, they conclude that the rule of law 
“follows quite naturally from Christian premises.”206  For example, the idea 
that the law applies equally to everyone follows from the radical equality 
reflected in the biblical claim “that each of us is made in God’s image.”207  
Moreover, the Bible teaches that “we are all radically imperfect,” that “the 
desire for sin is woven into our very being.”208  Because everyone is “prone to 
selfishness and exploitation,”209 those charged with the responsibility of 
governing society cannot yield “unbounded discretion”210 and “pass 
judgment”211 on others.  Thus, biblical teaching provides further moral 
justification for a legal system in which “[c]learly articulated rules, not jurors’ 
or judges’ whims [are] the basis for decisions that impose criminal or civil 
liability.”212 
According to Skeel and Stuntz, however, problems arise when law exceeds 
its competence, when it “strays from the modest goal of resolving litigation 
outcomes.”213  That is, when lawmakers believe that the primary goal of law is 
to teach values, they end up enacting comprehensive moral codes.  Then “the 
rule of law becomes a veneer that hides the rule of discretion.”214  Indeed, 
moral laws that purport to teach through the imposition of legal penalties “are 
likely only to teach lessons in arbitrary government and the rule of 
discretion.”215  Thus, Skeel and Stuntz conclude that “[t]he rule of law works 
only if law does not seek to rule too much.”216 
A particularly egregious example of law run amok can be found in what 
Skeel and Stuntz refer to as “legal moralism.”217  By this they mean the 
practice of enacting “purely symbolic laws”218 which lawmakers know “will 
rarely be enforced.”219  As such, these sorts of measures are largely a “means 
 
 204. Id. at 810. 
 205. Skeel & Skuntz, supra note 20, at 811. 
 206. Id. at 816. 
 207. Id. at 813. 
 208. Id. at 814. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 815. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 213. Id. at 811. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 812. 
 216. Id. at 811. 
 217. Id. at 838. 
 218. Id. at 828. 
 219. Id. at 824. 
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of sending messages to voters, not sending offenders to prison.”220  At the 
same time, because they exist on the books, laws of this sort vest law 
enforcement officials with enormous discretion.  Accordingly, when they are 
enforced “the message the law sends is bound to be different than the message 
embodied in the relevant statute.”221 
Skeel and Stuntz cite to a number of examples of the immodesty of legal 
moralism, including the Mann Act, the Travel Act, the experience of state 
enforced temperance under Prohibition, and the various federal bans on 
narcotics and gambling,222 as well as Congress’s recent efforts to respond to 
corporate mismanagement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.223  Given Skeel and 
Stuntz’s professed Christianity, however, what stands out is their criticism of 
legal attempts to regulate abortion. 
V.  LAW, CULTURE, AND THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPLICATION 
According to Skeel and Stuntz, the “chief object” of law is not to teach but 
to rule, and law rules best “when its ambitions are modest,” that is, when law is 
limited to “[i]dentifying the most destructive wrongs . . . for fair, accurate 
adjudication.”224  Thus, law should “draw lines not between right and wrong 
but between the most destructive and verifiable wrongs, and everything 
else.”225  Law must be content with “restraining the worst wrongs by the 
citizenry without empowering judges and prosecutors to do wrong 
themselves.”226  The “grander ambitions our law seems to have” for shaping 
the moral norms that will govern social life are, in their assessment, “not 
achievable.”227 
Skeel and Stuntz are critical of legal efforts to restrict abortion because 
they see such measures as examples of legal immodesty.  The criminal 
prohibitions against abortion that preceded Roe v. Wade228 were, they say, 
largely symbolic laws.  They did not reduce the incidence of abortion.  Indeed, 
 
 220. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 825. 
 221. Id. at 828.  In this regard Skeel and Stuntz make several pointed references to the special 
counsel’s investigation of President Clinton involving Monica Lewinsky and the prosecution and 
conviction of Martha Stewart for lying to federal investigators.  In each case, the charge 
ultimately brought was distinct from or even unrelated to the subject matter of the original 
investigation.  The authors see this as proof of the enormous discretion that the wide-ranging 
federal criminal code affords prosecutors.  See id. at 821–822, 827. 
 222. Id. at 825. 
 223. Id. at 826. 
 224. Id. at 830–31. 
 225. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 839. 
 226. Id. at 817. 
 227. Id. at 831. 
 228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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according to Skeel and Stuntz, “[t]he number of abortions rose steeply in the 
years leading up to Roe.”229  Moreover, laws prohibiting abortion “did not 
reinforce the social norm against th[e] practice.”230  Instead, Skeel and Stuntz 
contend that “the norm fell apart while those bans were still in place.”231  Thus, 
the law proved to be both an ineffective teacher and a poor ruler.  Indeed, for 
Skeel and Stuntz, the law against abortion failed to teach precisely because it 
failed to rule. 
As such, anti-abortion laws are, for Skeel and Stuntz, a misguided effort to 
use the law as a “tool . . . for healing a spiritually diseased society.”232  With 
respect to abortion, Christians, they say, should avoid the “tendency to confuse 
God’s law with man’s”233 and resist the temptation “to enact their preferred 
moral vision into law.”234  Plainly, “immorality and illegality cannot and must 
not be coextensive.”235  Not only do such efforts to equate them undermine the 
rule of law values, but Skeel and Stuntz also contend that it is “abundantly 
clear that law cannot save souls.”236 
A. Abortion Restrictions: The Pursuit of Justice, Not Salvation 
Skeel and Stuntz are undoubtedly correct in asserting that Christians, and 
indeed people of other religious faiths, can fall into the error of “[c]onflating 
God’s law and man’s law.”237  Indeed, the tendency to overreach—to use the 
law to impose one’s moral vision on society as a whole—is a trait shared even 
by avowed secularists and persons of no religious persuasion at all.  Moreover, 
Skeel and Stuntz are also plainly correct in asserting that the purpose of the 
law is not to bring about some sort of spiritual healing for a troubled society.  
Indeed, because the proper ambition of law is not theological in nature, the 
purpose of law cannot be to “save souls.”238 
Instead, the purpose of law is to achieve justice.  Plainly, Skeel and Stuntz 
believe that the kinds of injustice to which the law should be directed are 
relatively narrow.  That is, in order to guard against unfettered discretion and 
preserve the rule of law, Skeel and Stuntz argue that law’s reach should exhibit 
modesty by addressing only “the worst wrongs”239 that people commit.  By 
 
 229. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 833 (citing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 353–55 (1991)). 
 230. Id. at 829. 
 231. Id. (citing ROSENBERG, supra note 229). 
 232. Id. at 837. 
 233. Id. at 832. 
 234. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 837. 
 235. Id. at 838. 
 236. Id. at 831. 
 237. Id. at 839. 
 238. Id. at 831. 
 239. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 817. 
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identifying laws against abortion as examples of the vice of “legal moralism,” 
however, Skeel and Stuntz suggest that they do not believe that justice—the 
“chief object” of law240—is at stake in laws that seek to limit abortion.  Indeed, 
while Skeel and Stuntz obliquely suggest that women might be dissuaded from 
seeking abortions if abortion opponents made use of techniques other than the 
coercive force of law,241 they give no indication that they believe that the act of 
abortion is itself a matter of injustice. 
Here, the clear voice of John Paul II offers an indispensable perspective.  
First, the Pope forthrightly reminds us of the object of abortion.  That is, 
abortion always involves “the deliberate and direct killing . . . of a human 
being in the initial phase of his or her existence.”242  Thus, he says it is no 
exaggeration to say “that we are dealing with murder” since “[t]he one 
eliminated is a human being at the very beginning of life.”243  Although some 
individuals who purport to speak from a Christian perspective openly dispute 
these claims,244 in their essay Skeel and Stuntz do not deny the humanity of the 
entity developing in the womb, nor do they deny the moral claim that such a 
being has to our protection—to be free from the violent act of dismemberment 
and extermination.  Certainly John Paul would agree with Skeel and Stuntz that 
morality and legality are not coextensive insofar as “the purpose of civil law is 
different and more limited in scope than that of the moral law.”245  At the same 
time, given the nature of the procedure and its ultimate end, it is difficult to 
understand why Skeel and Stuntz apparently do not regard abortion as one of 
“the worse wrongs,” one of “the most destructive and verifiable wrongs”246 
that the law ought to address. 
 
 240. Id. at 829–30. 
 241. See id. at 835 (arguing that the effort expended “in trying to make the statute books 
mirror the law of God . . . distracts religious believers from other, more limited efforts that might 
command wide-spread support”).  At a conference hosted by the Lumen Christi Institute and the 
Law Professors’ Christian Fellowship that included a panel on the Skeel-Stuntz thesis, David 
Skeel made clear his opposition to abortion and his support for pro-life legal efforts.  While this is 
surely welcome news, these views are wholly absent from Skeel and Stuntz’s article. 
 242. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 58. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON, OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE: TOWARD A NEW 
ETHIC OF ABORTION (1983); Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Personhood, Covenant, and Abortion, 
THE ANN. OF THE SOC’Y OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1983), reprinted in ABORTION AND 
CATHOLICISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE 100 (Patricia Beattie Jung & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 
1988). 
 245. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 71.  For a more complete discussion of this point 
see Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J., John Paul II, John Courtney Murray, and the Relationship 
Between Civil Law and Moral Law: A Constructive Proposal for Contemporary American 
Pluralism, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 231, 233–43 (2004). 
 246. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 839. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] JOHN PAUL II, THE STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 353 
Second, the late Pope plainly had no illusions that the problem of abortion 
could be easily solved through the machinations of law.  Indeed, as noted 
above, John Paul understood the priority that culture enjoys over formal norms 
that govern human behavior, including law.247  Thus, he recognized that 
abortion is a complex cultural phenomenon made up of a number of attitudes 
and beliefs embodied in various institutions and practices.  Taken together, 
these attitudes and beliefs constitute a “culture of death” that is “actively 
fostered by powerful cultural, economic and political currents which encourage 
an idea of society excessively concerned with efficiency.”248  From this 
cultural perspective any life “which would require greater acceptance, love and 
care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden.”249  From this 
point of view, a human being whose mere existence “compromises the well-
being or life-style of those who are more favoured . . . [is] looked upon as an 
enemy to be resisted or eliminated.”250  Thus, at the foundation of this cultural 
phenomenon John Paul discerned “a completely individualistic conception of 
freedom, which ends up by becoming the freedom of ‘the strong’ against the 
weak.”251 
This morbid culture assumes concrete form in various practices and 
institutions as “actual ‘structures of sin’ which go against life”252 which 
“oppose . . . human life not yet born.”253  This “conspiracy against life” 
includes not only the individual choices of women and men who opt for 
abortion, but also doctors and nurses who “place at the service of death skills 
which were acquired for promoting life,” government officials who 
“promote . . . and approve . . . abortion laws” as well as those “international 
institutions, foundations and associations which systematically campaign for 
the legalization and spread of abortion in the world.”254  As such, the Pope 
recognized that “abortion goes beyond the responsibility of individuals and 
beyond the harm done to them, and takes on a distinctly social dimension.”255 
Plainly, the cultural task of responding to this vast apparatus of institutions 
and beliefs and the further task of social renovation—the process of proposing 
and establishing a new set of values and convictions—is beyond the limited 
capacity of law to accomplish.  Because the “structures of sin” that support 
abortion are founded on the beliefs and attitudes of the “culture of death,” 
genuine social change demands that these cultural values be confronted.  
 
 247. See supra Part III. 
 248. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para. 12. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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 252. Id. para. 24. 
 253. Evangelium Vitae, supra note 9, para 59. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
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According to John Paul, “[w]hat is urgently called for is a general mobilization 
of consciences and a united ethical effort to activate a great campaign in 
support of life.”256  Indeed, genuine cultural change “demands from everyone 
the courage to adopt a new life-style, consisting in making practical choices—
at the personal, family, social and international level—on the basis of a correct 
scale of values: the primacy of being over having, of the person over 
things.”257 
Accordingly, the Pope makes emphatically clear that “it is not enough to 
remove unjust laws”258 that guarantee the abortion license.  Beyond this, “[t]he 
underlying causes of attacks on life have to be eliminated, especially by 
ensuring proper support for families and motherhood.”259  Still, John Paul also 
makes plain that while “laws are not the only means of protecting human 
life, . . . they do play a very important and sometimes decisive role in 
influencing patterns of thought and behaviour.”260  Thus, although John Paul 
recognizes that the struggle against the practice of abortion is primarily a 
cultural struggle, it necessarily entails a legal dimension.  Indeed, given the 
immensity of the problem, the “truly alarming spectacle” of “attacks on life” 
that occur in an “unheard-of numerical proportion” with “widespread legal 
approval and the involvement of certain sectors of health-care personnel,”261 
any proposed reform of the culture must, unavoidably, engage the legal order. 
Lastly, when pro-life efforts to reduce abortions do engage the legal order 
they do not constitute an attempt to impose an inherently religious view of 
women, or sexuality, or the developing human person on society as a whole.  
To their credit Skeel and Stuntz do not derisively refer to the “Christian 
Right”262 and roil against the impending establishment of an American 
theocracy, as others have done.263  At the same time, they do repeatedly refer 
to the problem of “[c]onflating God’s law and man’s law”264 and the “danger 
in trying to make the statute books mirror the law of God.”265  Thus, while 
Skeel and Stuntz’s concern is the existence of rules that vest public officials 
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with inordinate discretion,266 their rhetoric has the whiff of an extreme and 
intolerant secularism. 
Although pro-life legal efforts may coincide with the moral teaching of any 
number of faiths, including Christianity, the same could be said of any number 
of laws including such basic crimes as those prohibiting theft and murder.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that a legal ordinance is not 
constitutionally infirm under the Establishment Clause simply “because it 
‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.’”267  
Moreover, because the justifications put forth for such laws are entirely secular 
in nature they meet the requirement of “public reason” advanced by a number 
of legal and political theorists.268  Indeed, as John Paul made clear, the cause of 
the protection of the unborn is not an exclusively Christian concern.  Although 
human life “certainly has a sacred and religious value, . . . in no way is that 
value a concern only of believers.”269  Indeed, because “[t]he value at stake is 
one which every human being can grasp by the light of reason . . . it 
necessarily concerns everyone.”270  Thus, legal efforts to restrict abortion do 
not aim to “save souls” or to protect the country from damnation by a vengeful 
God.  Instead, properly understood, their concern is only justice in the here and 
now. 
B. No Mere Symbol: The Effect of Legal Restrictions on the Incidence of 
Abortion 
Skeel and Stuntz are right to criticize “purely symbolic laws,”271 that is, the 
practice whereby lawmakers seek to “please constituents who wish to condemn 
[a certain kind of] conduct without paying either the fiscal or political price of 
stopping that conduct.”272  Indeed, the act of declaring some form of behavior 
to be a crime can give the appearance of taking decisive action when in fact the 
measure affects nothing—a cheap salve advertised as real medicine.  Although 
their objection to these sorts of laws is sound, with respect to laws designed to 
curtail the practice of abortion, it is sadly misplaced.  These laws are not purely 
symbolic.  Moreover, this is true both for those laws that flatly prohibited 
abortion prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,273 as 
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well as the more modest restrictions that the Court has since begrudgingly 
allowed. 
1. The Effectiveness of Modest, Contemporary Restrictions 
First, with respect to the more limited kinds of laws now in place, the 
available evidence indicates that these laws have been effective in helping to 
reduce the frequency of abortion.  Indeed, a number of studies have concluded 
that parental involvement laws and restrictions on Medicaid funding have 
resulted in a lower incidence of abortion in the jurisdictions where these laws 
are in place.274  As Michael New has pointed out, however, these studies have 
not accounted for the fact that the lower incidence of abortion in these states 
may reflect “changes in values and mores, not the legislation itself.”275  Put 
another way, the declines in abortion experienced in these states may be due to 
the influence of culture rather than law.  Indeed, the mere fact that this sort of 
legislation was enacted at all may simply reflect a change in the underlying 
cultural norms. 
In his own recent study, New argues that the impact of legal restrictions 
can be isolated from the effect of cultural changes by comparing the 
experience in states whose restrictions have been nullified by courts with the 
experience of states where the restrictions have been upheld and enforced.  
 
 274. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank et al., State Abortion Rates: The Impact of Policies, 
Providers, Politics, Demographics, and Economic Environment, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 513, 513–
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MGMT. 498, 509 (1993) (concluding that the rate of minors’ abortions per 1,000 teenage 
pregnancies is 16% lower, and the rate of minors’ abortions per 1,000 women ages 15–19 is 25% 
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Involvement Laws Reduce Adolescent Abortion Rates?, 12 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 65, 75 
(1994).  But see, Deborah Haas-Wilson, Women’s Reproductive Choices: The Impact of Medicaid 
Funding Restrictions, 29:5 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 228, 232 (Sept./Oct. 1997) (concluding that 
Medicaid funding restrictions do not affect the abortion rate in models controlling for the 
availability of abortion providers and other variables). 
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ABORTION 2 (2006) [hereinafter NEW, USING NATURAL EXPERIMENTS], available at 
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That is, because “[p]resumably, all states that pass pro-life legislation [have] 
undergo[ne] similar changes in values and mores” comparing “nullified-
legislation states to enacted-legislation states effectively holds constant any 
changes in values and mores.”276  From conducting this analysis, he concludes 
that cultural shifts in values “have little impact on the incidence of abortion” 
whereas “enacted legislation results in statistically significant reductions in 
abortion rates and ratios.”277  Specifically, New finds that with respect to 
informed consent laws “the abortion ratio decreases by 10.34 abortions for 
every thousand live births and the abortion rate decreases by 0.86 abortions per 
thousand women between the ages of 15 and 44.”278  Similarly, in the case of 
parental involvement laws, New finds that “the abortion rate decreases by 
16.37 abortions for every thousand live births and the abortion rate decreases 
by 1.15 abortions for every thousand women” of child-bearing age.279  
Moreover, in each case, the difference in the abortion rates and ratios between 
the states where the legislation was nullified and where it was enforced is 
statistically significant.280  As such, Skeel and Stuntz’s label of “purely 
symbolic laws” is plainly inapposite. 
2. The Effectiveness of Abortion Prohibitions Prior to Legalization 
Second, the degree to which the abortion restrictions in place during the 
time prior to legalization were “purely symbolic laws” is the source of some 
considerable debate.  This debate centers around two sets of competing factual 
claims.  The first set of claims involves the extent to which prohibitions against 
abortion were enforced by prosecutors and other officials.  The second set of 
claims involves estimates regarding the incidence of abortion under a legal 
regime that criminally banned the procedure. 
a. The Enforcement of Abortion Prohibitions by Prosecutors and the 
Medical Profession 
With respect to the first set of claims, a number of proponents of abortion 
contend that the laws in place prior to both Roe and the state reforms that 
preceded it were, indeed, merely “symbolic” for the simple reason that they 
were rarely, if ever, enforced.  For example, Mark Graber has argued at length 
that the criminal law of abortion involved a combination of “official 
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prohibition and official permissiveness”281 such that legal restrictions against 
the procedure constituted a kind of institutional hypocrisy, the real effect of 
which was the “discriminatory” treatment of poor women and racial 
minorities.282 
Notwithstanding the emphatic way in which the claim is made, a fair 
reading of the available evidence simply does not support the assertion that 
laws prohibiting abortion went unenforced.  Indeed, at least as evidenced by 
newspaper accounts and appellate decisions,283 the historical record suggests 
that criminal prosecutions of abortionists were frequent, though not always 
successful.  Some attribute the difficulty in obtaining convictions to police and 
juries drawn from a public sympathetic to the plight of women with unwanted 
pregnancies and accepting of the need for abortion.284  While support for 
abortion may explain the failure of some prosecutions, a more plausible 
account for the pattern as a whole has to do with the nature of abortion itself 
and the proof required for conviction.  That is, during the era of 
criminalization, abortion was something done in secret by individuals who 
deliberately sought to conceal the nature of their actions.285  Moreover, both 
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the woman and the person who performed the abortion had a keen interest in 
maintaining this secrecy following the procedure, while disposing of the 
remains of the aborted fetus could be accomplished with relative ease.  
Accordingly, “[w]ithout witnesses or evidence, the crime would be undetected 
and unpunished.”286 
It was certainly the case that enforcement of the laws against abortion 
varied greatly over time and across jurisdictions.  Nevertheless, it is also true 
that “prosecutions for illegal abortions occurred in every decade in every major 
metropolitan area throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth 
century.”287  It also appears to be the case that the lack of rigorous enforcement 
in some areas was the result of official corruption.288  While the practice of 
extorting money from abortion providers did take place, it did not define the 
approach taken by law enforcement toward abortion in its entirety since many 
arrests ultimately “resulted in convictions, an unlikely outcome if bribery were 
the goal.”289 
The difficulties of proof involved in obtaining abortion convictions led 
prosecutors in the first half of the twentieth century to pursue those cases in 
which the woman obtaining the abortion died as a result of the procedure.290  
Indeed, given the difficulties described above “it is hardly surprising that 
criminal prosecutions in the United States depended to a large extent on the 
death bed statements of aborted women.”291  Although there is no record of a 
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woman being prosecuted under a statute prohibiting abortion, as a technical 
matter such women could be charged with a crime in some jurisdictions.292  
This led New York to amend its laws to make clear that women who 
underwent the procedure could be given immunity in exchange for testimony 
against the person who performed the abortion.293  Although obtaining 
convictions in abortion cases remained difficult, “police investigations . . . 
could themselves be a form of punishment and a serious deterrent even if no 
charges were ever brought.”294 
Some jurisdictions also introduced the practice of using paid informants 
who posed as women seeking abortions as a method of obtaining evidence 
against illicit abortion providers.295  Although “[n]umerous convictions of 
abortionists were reversed for entrapment,”296 the aggressive use of paid 
investigators would seem to dispel the notion that law enforcement quietly 
tolerated the practice of abortion.  Indeed, it demonstrates that “police and 
prosecutors were going to extraordinary lengths to detect and eliminate 
abortionists.”297  What is more, the number of abortion prosecutions actually 
increased in the 1950s and continued up until the time that Roe was decided.298 
In addition to criminal prosecution, the laws against abortion were also 
enforced indirectly through the revocation of medical licenses of those 
physicians who performed abortions.  Because this sort of proceeding was civil 
in nature, “the finding of a violation needed only be proven by preponderance 
of the evidence rather than, as in a criminal prosecution, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”299  Although the level to which these professional disciplinary actions 
were effective in reducing the number of physicians from performing abortions 
or curbing the incidence of abortion itself cannot be known, the fact that 
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doctors’ licenses were regularly revoked or suspended for abortion activities 
cannot be seriously contested.300 
Accordingly, with respect to the question of whether the laws against 
abortion were the sort of “purely symbolic” laws that Skeel and Stuntz deride 
cannot be answered based on the historical record.  Plainly, the criminal and 
civil rules against abortion did not lie dormant during the decades before state 
liberalization efforts and the Court’s decision in Roe.  Nevertheless, to say that 
“abortion laws were regularly enforced before Roe v. Wade”301 might suggest 
that enforcement was “regular” relative to the frequency of the law’s violation.  
However, the incidence of abortion cannot be known with any certainty based 
upon the number of criminal prosecutions and license revocations. 302  Instead, 
figures for the incidence of abortion prior to legalization need to be calculated 
using other methods. 
b. The Incidence of Abortion Prior to Legalization 
With respect to the second set of factual claims, the way in which the issue 
has been framed has been to compare the incidence of illegal abortion in the 
era of criminalization with the incidence of abortion following both the 
liberalization of state abortion laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade.  There is no dispute that abortions 
took place in large numbers during the time in which states uniformly 
prohibited the procedure.  The question—indeed, the heart of the matter as to 
whether such legal measures were “purely symbolic”—is the frequency with 
which the law was violated.  How common were illegal abortions during the 
time before the advent of abortion reform in the states and the invalidation of 
abortion restrictions under Roe?  Did the frequency of abortion increase 
significantly following its legalization?  Or does the historical record show that 
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the large numbers of abortions performed in the wake of legislative reform and 
judicial action would have taken place in any event, albeit in violation of the 
law?  Little or no difference between these two figures would show that the 
laws in place were mostly symbolic, whereas a wide differential between them 
would show the efficacy of anti-abortion legal measures. 
Unfortunately, this way of framing the issue has tended not to yield 
answers, only further controversy, because of the dubious nature of the 
statistics that purportedly reflect the frequency of abortion during the era of 
criminalization.  Thus, while many commentators on the subject acknowledge 
the uncertainty of abortion figures prior to legalization,303 those same 
commentators often assert the validity of their own estimates with a 
remarkable degree of confidence.304  Sadly, in this regard, many proponents of 
legal abortion continue to cite to long-discredited estimates, 305 engaging in the 
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have routinely cited the 1.2 million figure as if it were an undisputed fact rather than a dubious 
estimate.  See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 41 (1990) 
(stating that “[b]y the late 1960s as many as 1,200,000 women were undergoing illegal abortions 
each year”).  In support of this claim, Tribe cites JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE 
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900, at 254 (1978) (“By the late 1960s 
estimates of the number of illegal abortions performed in the United States each year ranged from 
200,000 to 1,200,000.”), who in turn cites N.Y. GOVERNOR’S SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW 
THE STATE’S ABORTION LAWS, REPORT 15 (1968).  Governor Nelson Rockefeller created the so-
called “Froesel Commission” because of the perceived need to generate additional legislative 
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conceit that these figures are not in dispute.  These authors are either oblivious 
to the fact that these studies have been dismissed or they simply choose to 
continue to cite these works because it appears to suit their argument.306 
 
support for abortion reform.  See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 628; GARROW, supra, at 345–
47.  The Commission, whose members included Alan Guttmacher, Christopher Tietze, and Cyril 
Means, relied upon the Statistics Committee paper in the published volume of the proceedings of 
the 1955 Planned Parenthood conference.  See GARROW, supra, at 346.  Thus, notwithstanding 
the Committee’s warning that there was “no objective basis” for selecting any number within the 
range, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 180, many advocates of abortion have 
persisted in anointing the 1.2 million figure as the truth.  See, e.g., CAROLE JOFFE, DOCTORS OF 
CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE 29 
(1995) (citing 1.2 million figure).  Significantly, the 1.2 million, figure cited by the 1955 Planned 
Parenthood conference, that has been so enthusiastically embraced by abortion supporters, is 
itself derived from the much discredited Kinsey materials.  See GERMAIN GRISEZ, ABORTION: 
THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES AND THE ARGUMENTS 40 (1970); see also infra note 306. 
 306. For example, in support of his statement that “[s]cholars estimate that one out of every 
three to five pregnancies in the United States was aborted during the first seventy years of the 
twentieth century,” Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past, supra note 281, at 316, Mark Graber in 
part cites to a study published by the Alfred C. Kinsey Institute for Sex Research.  See id. at 316 
n.27 (citing GEBHARD et al., supra note 284 , at 93–94).  Graber seems not to know, or chooses to 
ignore, the many severe criticisms leveled against this study for, among other things, the 
unrepresentative nature of the women surveyed.  See, e.g., GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 39. 
Indeed, the Kinsey study has been criticized as unreliable even by ardent supporters of the 
abortion license.  The Statistics Committee of the 1955 Planned Parenthood conference 
concluded that the data in the Kinsey report did “not provide an adequate basis for reliable 
estimates of the incidence of induced abortion in the urban white population of the United States, 
much less in the total population.”  ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 305, at 179; 
see also DANIEL CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 135–36 (1970) 
(commenting that a number of studies, including those by Kinsey and Gebhard, “did not have 
representative population samples, and yet their figures were used to provide the basis for the 
high estimates”); Robert G. Potter, Jr., Abortion in the United States, 37 MILBANK MEMORIAL 
FUND Q. 92, 94 (1959) (book review) (observing that Christopher Tietze contends that the Kinsey 
survey respondents are usefully representative but that “his tables contradict this conclusion by 
showing not only gross differences with respect to age, education, and marital status, but also, 
and more important, tangible differences with respect to age-specific marital fertility”).  These 
severe criticisms notwithstanding, Graber’s article would have the reader believe that the Kinsey 
report’s findings have gone unchallenged. 
  Although Graber seems to want to make amends for this omission in his book, his effort 
falls short.  He notes that the Kinsey study has been criticized because the women surveyed did 
not include representative numbers of urban dwellers, minority women, and unmarried women.  
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 281, at 165 n.42.  Graber trumpets the fact that this 
criticism is heard from “opponents of legal abortion.”  Id.  He again fails to note, however, that 
this same criticism is voiced by the supporters of legal abortion as well.  See, e.g., ABORTION IN 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 305, at 178 (concluding that the women surveyed in the Kinsey 
materials “do not constitute a representative sample of the population of the United States”); 
CALLAHAN, supra.  What is more, Graber contends that this weakness is in fact a strength.  He 
argues that the under-representation of these groups of women indicates that the Kinsey study 
likely understates the actual incidence of abortion prior to legalization because “[p]ersons of 
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To their credit, some writers on the subject have recognized the tendency 
of certain authors to favor estimates which in turn favor the author’s own 
moral and legal predilections with respect to the issue.307  Given the widely 
shared view that firm numbers reflecting the era of criminalization are hard to 
come by, it is difficult to disagree with Joseph Dellapenna’s statement that 
“[a]ny estimate of the incidence of illegal abortion must remain largely a 
guess.”308  At the same time, it is undoubtedly the case that some guesses are 
better than others. 
In support of their contention that anti-abortion laws were ineffective and 
so merely symbolic, Skeel and Stuntz rely almost entirely on one source, 
 
color, urban dwellers, and unmarried women . . . have much higher illegal abortion rates than the 
women Kinsey surveyed.”  GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 281, at 165 n.42.  Here 
again, however, Graber appears to miss the main criticism concerning the unrepresentative nature 
of the Kinsey study, namely the fact that the women surveyed were not drawn from a random 
sample.  Indeed, these women were self-selected in that they had “some interest in, and 
comprehended the value of, sex research.”  GEBHARD et al., supra note 284, at 14.  This likely 
had “the greatest effect on the validity not only of this study but of all the Kinsey material.”   
GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 39. 
  Similarly, historian James Mohr cites to Frederick Taussig’s work, “a classic study 
published in 1936” in which he estimated “that over half a million illegal abortions were then 
taking place in the United States annually.”  MOHR, supra note 305, at 254.  In fact, Taussig 
estimated that some 681,600 abortions took place throughout the country each year.  See 
FREDERICK J. TAUSSIG, ABORTION: SPONTANEOUS AND INDUCED: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL 
ASPECTS 28 (1936).  Mohr does not consider the critique of Taussig’s study based on the fact that 
the bulk of his data is derived from case histories of patients at a New York birth control clinic 
reported in MARIE E. KOPP, BIRTH CONTROL PRACTICE (1934).  He does not pause to consider 
how such data might diverge significantly from the population as a whole.  Nor does Mohr bother 
to consider how Taussig’s data for rural areas might be flawed given that it was based on 
questionnaires sent to Iowa physicians who were simply asked to give “their estimate” as to the 
frequency of the practice.  See GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 35–36.  What is worse, Mohr does not 
consider the fact that in 1944 Taussig repudiated his estimate of 681,800 annual abortions as far 
too high.  See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 537 (citing Statement of Dr. Frederick Taussig, 
NAT. COMM. ON MATERNAL HEALTH, THE ABORTION PROBLEM 28 (1944)).  Perhaps the 
effusive praise of Taussig’s work offered by the author of a law review comment who did not 
have the benefit of this criticism can be forgiven, see Comment, A Medicolegal Analysis of 
Abortion Statutes, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 181 n.1 (1958) (stating that Taussig’s work should be 
“required reading” for legislators), but this is hardly an excuse for a professional historian like 
Mohr or more recent commentators who continue to rely on Taussig’s repudiated figure.  See 
DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 537 n.423 (citing additional examples). 
 307. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557 (“The larger estimates have found an audience 
among those who favored the legalization of abortion as it allows them to claim that the abortion 
laws were a failure and therefore should have been repealed.”); GRISEZ, supra note 305, at 41 
(“One opposed to legalized abortion naturally would like to minimize the dimensions of the 
problem.”). 
 308. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557. 
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namely, Gerald Rosenberg’s book The Hollow Hope.309  Indeed, they cite 
Rosenberg for the proposition that “[c]ommon estimates of the number of 
illegal abortions during the 1960s . . . range from 500,000 to 1.5 million.”310  
For his part, Rosenberg acknowledges that “illegal abortions are impossible to 
count accurately” such that “[f]or obvious reasons of partisanship and lack of 
hard data” the proffered figures for illegal abortions “can only be taken as very 
rough estimates.”311  Although he further cautions that “one should approach 
estimates of the number of illegal abortions with care,” in the next breath he 
concludes that “the 1 million figure is probably not a grossly unreasonable 
estimate.”312  Likewise, in another article, Stuntz contends that “[b]y most 
 
 309. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 173–201, 353–55 (1991). 
 310. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 829 n.46 (citing ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 353–
55 & tbl.A1). 
 311. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 353. 
 312. Id. at 355.  There are a number reasons to criticize Rosenberg’s analysis of the issue 
regarding the annual number of abortions that took place prior to legalization.  First, Rosenberg 
treats all of the estimates he draws upon as empirical studies of the issue.  This, however, is 
plainly not the case.  Indeed, some of the sources he cites are merely duplicative of one another.  
That is, they repeat the same figures, but these figures represent only one empirical study.  For 
example, Rosenberg cites to Taussig, see TAUSSIG supra note 306, and the Kinsey materials, see 
GEBHARD ET AL., supra note 284, and then to a law review article as if it were an independent 
source.  See ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 354 tbl.A1 (citing Zad Leavy & Jerome M. Kummer, 
Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (1962)).  In 
fact, however, this article simply relies on Taussig’s study and the Kinsey materials.  See Leavy 
& Kummer, supra, at 123–24.  Rosenberg also has the audacity to cite to a sponsor’s statement by 
Senator Robert Packwood introducing abortion reform legislation in the Senate.  ROSENBERG, 
supra note 309, at 354 tbl.A1 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 12673 (1970) (statement of Sen. 
Packwood)).  Rosenberg would have the reader believe that Packwood’s statement should be 
treated as a serious, independent authority.  In fact, however, Packwood conducted no 
independent research in support of the figures he advances.  He merely repeats the 1 million 
abortions per year figure which he obtained from another source.  The same could be said of 
Rosenberg’s citations to articles in the New York Times, the New Republic, and Newsweek.  
ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 354 tbl.A1. 
  Perhaps even more troubling is that Rosenberg fails to cite to a number of authorities that 
do genuinely set forth independent research.  What is apparent about each of these studies is that 
they do not favor Rosenberg’s preferred number of 1 million abortions per year.   These sources 
include James R. Abernathy, Bernard G. Greenberg & Daniel G. Horvitz, Estimates of Induced 
Abortion in Urban North Carolina, 7 DEMOGRAPHY 19, 29 (1970) (study which extrapolates out 
to about 829,000 abortions per year nationally) and Barbara J. Syska, Thomas W. Hilgers & 
Dennis O'Hare, An Objective Model for Estimating Criminal Abortions and Its Implications for 
Public Policy, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 171 (Thomas W. Hilgers, Dennis J. 
Horan & David Mall eds., 1981) (using maternal mortality rates due to criminal abortion and 
natural pregnancy to estimate that between 39,000-210,000 abortions took place annually prior to 
legalization). 
  The study by Syska, Hilgers, and O’Hare poses an especially serious challenge to the 1 
million illegal abortions per year figure championed by Rosenberg and others.  In it, the authors 
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use the number of maternal deaths due to criminal abortion, the maternal death rate due to natural 
pregnancy, and the degree to which criminal abortion is more dangerous than natural pregnancy 
to predict the number of illegal abortions for a given year.  See id.; see also generally Brian W. 
Clowes, The Role of Maternal Deaths in the Abortion Debate, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 327 
(1993) (demonstrating the use of greatly exaggerated maternal death figures by abortion 
proponents in the abortion debate). 
  To his credit, Mark Graber at least recognizes this challenge.  His response, however, 
leaves something to be desired.  Indeed, Graber seems not to fully comprehend the implications 
of the model Syska and her colleagues put forth.  Thus, Graber offers several superficial 
criticisms of Syska, Hilgers, and O’Hare’s study.  For example, he tries to make a virtue out of 
the fact that pro-choice advocates have ignored the Syska study in asserting that “no article 
published after 1960 in a respectable medical, public health, or scientific journal supports the 
claim of pro-life advocates that less than 200,000 abortions were being performed annually in the 
United States during the period when abortion was illegal.”  GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, 
supra note 281 at 23.  Instead, Graber says that “[t]he most reliable studies” support the figure of 
1 million abortions per year.  Id.  This, of course, is not an argument in favor of these other 
studies, merely a rhetorical assertion on Graber’s part.  He does not present any reasons for 
having confidence in their reliability, only his commendation that they are so. 
  More importantly, Graber criticizes the Syska study for “calculat[ing] the relative risk of 
the average criminal abortion by using a survey of ‘the nonwhite population of New York City.’”  
Id.  It is wrong, he says, to assume “that black women in Harlem had access to anything remotely 
resembling the same quality abortion services as had white women who lived in such affluent 
suburbs as Scarsdale and Great Neck.”  Id.  What Graber fails to mention, however, is that Syska 
and her co-authors explicitly make note of this very limitation themselves.  See Syska et al., 
supra, at 170–71.  What is more, they also note that when “applied on a national basis” this has 
the effect of “artificially inflat[ing the] estimate of criminal abortions,” id. at 170, a point that 
seems to have escaped Graber’s attention.  Indeed, the Syska study makes different predictions 
regarding the frequency of illegal abortion based on different assumptions that the procedure was 
either three, five, ten, or fifteen times more dangerous than carrying a pregnancy to term. 
  Here Graber fails to recognize the power of the model put forth by Syska and her co-
authors as it relates to other literature on the subject.  That is, even if the risk of maternal death 
due to illegal abortion was only twice as great as carrying a pregnancy to term, rather than three 
or five or ten times more dangerous, as the Syska study hypothesizes, the annual number of 
illegal abortions is still far below the 1 million per year figure that Graber champions.  See 
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 282, at 42, n.19.  For example, for the year 1967, 
Syska and her co-authors estimate that 135,000 criminal abortions took place based on the 
assumption that the risk of maternal death is five times greater in the case of criminal abortion 
than in the case of natural pregnancy.  Syska et al., supra, at 168.  If the same statistics are used 
but it is assumed that criminal abortion was only three times more dangerous than carrying a 
pregnancy to term, then the Syska study predicts that 225,000 abortions took place that year.  Id. 
at 168 tbl.3.  If instead it is assumed that criminal abortion was only twice as dangerous as natural 
pregnancy, then the formula yields a figure of 337,500 abortions.  If it is assumed that criminal 
abortion was no more dangerous than carrying the pregnancy to term, then the formula yields a 
figure of 675,000 abortions for 1967.  While these numbers are substantial, they are on the lower 
end of the 200,000 to 1.2 million range put forth at the famous Planned Parenthood conference in 
1955.  See ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 305, at 180.  More importantly, these 
figures are far below the 1 million abortions per year that Graber, Rosenberg, and many others 
(including by extension Skeel and Stuntz) tout as authoritative.  The point is that, if these 
numbers are correct—and Graber offers no sound reason why they should not be regarded as 
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estimates, there were about a million illegal abortions per year during the 
1960s.”313  Here again, his sole authority for this figure is Rosenberg.314 
Rosenberg provides a useful table that makes use of the annual abortion 
totals compiled by the Guttmacher Institute.315  It shows that the number of 
legal abortions rose from 22,700 in 1969 to 193,500 in 1970, to 485,800 in 
1971, 586,800 in 1972, and 744,600 in 1973, the year Roe was decided.316  
Likewise, he notes that legal abortions did not exceed 1 million per year until 
1975, reaching nearly 1.6 million abortions in 1985.317  For Rosenberg it is 
significant that “[t]here was no steep or unusual increase in the number of legal 
abortions following Roe” and that “[w]hile the increases were large and steady, 
they were smaller than those of previous years.”318 Thus, Rosenberg 
emphasizes that “the largest increase in the number of legal abortions 
occur[red] between 1970 and 1971, two years before Roe.”319 
This pattern of increase fits the thesis that Rosenberg seeks to advance in 
his book, namely that judicial action has not been quite as decisive in bringing 
about social change as others have opined.320  This pattern does not, however, 
lend support to Skeel and Stuntz’s thesis concerning the inability of law in 
general to help bring about social change.  Indeed, it undermines Skeel and 
Stuntz’s claim regarding the impotence of law.  Thus, although Skeel and 
Stuntz join with Rosenberg in observing that the number of abortions “rose 
steeply in the years leading up to Roe”321 they fail to mention the well-known 
historical reason that accounts for this change, namely the fact that between 
 
such—then it is plainly the case that the law prohibiting abortion was not “purely symbolic.”  
Indeed, it had an enormous influence on the frequency with which abortions were sought and 
obtained. 
 313. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1886 (2000). 
 314. Id. (citing ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 353–55 & tbl.A1). 
 315. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 180 tbl.6.1. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 179. 
 319. Id. at 178.  To further stress the increase in abortion prior to Roe, Rosenberg analyzes the 
data in two and three year blocks: 
The largest increase over a two-year period is in 1969–71 with an increase of 463,100 
legal abortions.  Next is 1970–72 with 393,300, about 26 percent higher than the 1972–74 
increase of 311,800.  The 1971–73 increase is only 258,800.  Even the 1973–75 increase 
is only 289,600.  The largest increase over three years comes in the pre-Roe 1969–72 
period where there were an additional 564,100 legal abortions.  The 1972–75 period saw 
an increase of 447,400 legal abortions, and between 1973 and 1976 the increase was 
434,700. 
Id. at 179. 
 320. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 1–8. 
 321. Skeel & Stuntz, supra note 20, at 833. 
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1966 and 1971 seventeen states either repealed or substantially liberalized their 
abortion statutes.322 
The “large and steady” increases witnessed in this period do not support 
the larger estimates of illegal abortions prior to Roe.  As noted above, 
Rosenberg—and with him Skeel and Stuntz—contends that 1 million abortions 
took place annually prior to both Roe and the legislative reforms that preceded 
it.  Yet, as Joseph Dellapenna observes, “[l]egal abortions did not reach 
1,000,000 until 1975—two full years after Roe and eight years after the first 
reform of the abortion statutes,” 323 a point with which Rosenberg agrees.324  
Thus, as large as the increases recounted above were, one would have expected 
them to have been even larger if the true level of illegal abortions had been 
toward the high end of the 200,000 to 1.2 million range that many proponents 
of abortion suggest and which Rosenberg and Skeel and Stuntz endorse.  
Indeed, Dellapenna concludes that “[a]ll of this seems to point towards the 
low-end estimates, without, of course, giving us anything like a precise 
figure.”325 
 
 322. The Roe court itself noted that in “the past several years” prior to its decision there was 
“a trend toward liberalization of abortion statutes” resulting in “less stringent laws, most of them 
patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, § 230.3.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 (1973).  
For a summary of the various state laws in place at the time Roe was decided as well as citation to 
these authorities, see Paul Benjamin Linton, Enforcement of State Abortion Statutes After Roe: A 
State-by-State Analysis, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 157, 158–61, 258 (1990). 
  In another chapter of his book, Rosenberg makes clear the legislative and political 
changes that took place during this time, though he does not explicitly correlate these changes to 
the increases in the incidence of abortion noted earlier.  See ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 258–
65.  While the fact that these legislative developments led to an increase in the incidence of 
growth in abortion supports Rosenberg’s narrow thesis that courts were not solely or even 
primarily responsible for this change in the social order, it pointedly undermines Skeel and 
Stuntz’s broader thesis that, in the case of abortion, law generally is unable to bring about 
substantial change in social practices.  That is, even if the figure of 1 million abortions per year 
before the state reforms were enacted is conceded, the jump to nearly 1.6 million abortions in 
1985 which Rosenberg reports must be reckoned as substantial in anyone’s estimation. 
 323. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557. 
 324. ROSENBERG, supra note 309, at 180 tbl.6.1. 
 325. DELLAPENNA, supra note 283, at 557.  The relatively slow growth in the annual number 
of abortions following legalization is even more pronounced if one makes use of the abortion 
statistics compiled by the Centers for Disease Control, as Dellapenna does, rather than the figures 
generated by the Guttmacher Institute, the research arm of Planned Parenthood, which Rosenberg 
employs.  Thus, for example, whereas the Guttmacher Institute reported that 744,600 legal 
abortions took place in 1973 and 898,600 in 1974, the CDC reported that 615,813 and 763,476 
legal abortions took place respectively for these same years.  Compare Lawrence B. Finer & 
Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON 
SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 6, 8 tbl.1 (Jan./Feb. 2003) with Lilo T. Strauss et al., Ctr. for 
Disease Control and Prevention, Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Abortion Surveillance—
United States, 2003, 55 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1, 16 tbl.2 (2006), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5511.pdf.  The difference lies in the use of 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] JOHN PAUL II, THE STRUCTURES OF SIN AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 369 
More importantly, if this is correct—if the number of illegal abortions was 
well below the 1 million per year figure advanced by Rosenberg, and by 
extension Skeel and Stuntz—then the law that prohibited the practice of 
abortion prior to Roe was not merely symbolic.  Indeed, this would suggest that 
it had a profound influence on the behavior of women and men with respect to 
the decision to terminate or sustain nascent human life.  Put another way, if as 
Skeel and Stuntz suggest, the law prohibiting abortion was only symbolic and 
so had no effect in curbing its incidence, then one would not have expected the 
annual number of abortions to rise from the inflated pre-legalization estimate 
of 1.2 million advanced by abortion advocates326 to almost 1.6 million in 1985, 
an increase of nearly one-third.  Indeed, if the law was of no effect, then one 
would not have expected the annual number of abortions to more than double 
from 744,600 in 1973 to nearly 1.5 million in 1979.327  If the law is incapable 
of promoting profound cultural change, if the law truly is modest in what it can 
hope to achieve, then the 1 million per year figure prior to legalization that 
Skeel and Stuntz endorse should have remained fairly constant.  Instead the 
data shows that from 1975 to 1985 the incidence of abortion increased by 
almost sixty percent.328 
C. The Law as Teacher: Beyond Simple Enforcement 
The lesson that should be learned from this historical experience of 
enormous change is a deeper appreciation for the teaching function that law 
performs.  The absence of legal restriction helped to usher in this change.  It 
helped to give birth to a culture in which abortion is practiced with alarming 
regularity.329  Indeed, a legal regime that recognized abortion as a civil and 
constitutional right served as the midwife for a “culture of death.”330  The law 
did not create the demand for abortion.  The desire on the part of some women 
to be rid of unwanted pregnancies existed long before Roe was decided and 
 
different methods of data collection.  The CDC only reports figures that it actually receives from 
the central health authorities for each of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia and New 
York City.  See Strauss, et al., supra, at 1–3, 8.  By contrast, the Guttmacher Institute directly 
contacts (with a mailed questionnaire) the abortion providers that it identifies.  For those 
providers that fail to respond to either its mailings or subsequent efforts at contact, the 
Guttmacher Institute uses the numbers reported to the various state health authorities.  Where 
such figures are not available, however, the Guttmacher Institute employs its own estimates.  See 
Finer & Henshaw, supra, at 6–9. 
 326. For a discussion regarding the origins of this dubious figure and its popularity among 
abortion advocates, see supra note 305. 
 327. See Finer & Henshaw, supra note 325, at 8 tbl.1 (reporting 1,497,700 abortions for 
1979). 
 328. Id. (reporting that abortions rose from 1.034 million in 1975 to 1.588 million in 1985). 
 329. For the twenty-eight years of legal abortion summarized in Finer and Henshaw’s study, 
on average 27 percent of all pregnancies in America have ended in abortion.  Id. 
 330. See supra notes 242–61 and accompanying text. 
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will undoubtedly continue to exist in some form in the future.  But the law did 
legitimize this desire, and made its realization far easier to obtain.  By cloaking 
abortion in the aura of respectability, the law transformed abortion from a 
clandestine practice that was publicly derided to one that was openly practiced 
and widely supported.  The cultural message transmitted by this change in 
legal status could not help but alter the frequency of the practice. 
Indeed, the steady growth of abortion following legalization recounted 
above does more than call into question the exaggerated number of abortions 
that purportedly took place during the era of criminalization.  It also 
demonstrates the power of law’s teaching function.  That is, the reason why the 
number of abortions in the United States did not rise to 1 million per year until 
1975 is not only because the figure of 1 million per year prior to Roe was false.  
The reason this level was not achieved until two full years after Roe was 
decided and eight years after states began to adopt more liberal abortion 
statutes is that education takes time.  During this time, during the period of 
clamoring for the repeal of restrictions and indeed the constitutionalization of 
abortion on demand, women learned the lesson being taught by the law, the 
media,331 and through other venues of cultural expression.  They learned that 
the public approved of abortion—that abortion was no longer to be seen as an 
action worthy of condemnation but as a legitimate exercise of one’s inalienable 
freedom.  American women learned the lesson of cultural approval and so 
practiced abortion in far greater numbers than they did before legalization. 
Skeel and Stuntz do not entirely reject the notion of the law as teacher, but 
they severely limit it.  Thus, they concede that “[l]aw can indeed teach, but 
only when its chief object lies elsewhere,”332 namely when it pursues justice 
 
 331. For example, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the NEW YORK TIMES was an early and 
enthusiastic supporter, first of abortion reform, then repeal, and then the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe v. Wade.  See GARROW, supra note 305, at 298–317, 345–47, 357–58, 605–08 
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through the enforcement of specific ordinances.333  Thus, for Skeel and Stuntz, 
law teaches best when it rules modestly, when it “does not seek to rule too 
much,”334 when it does not “cover . . . too much territory.”335  Indeed, if we are 
to avoid the pitfall of excessive governmental discretion and “recover the rule 
of law,” they assure us that “it must be a more modest law that rules.”336 
Skeel and Stuntz are not wrong to insist that law teaches best when its 
lessons are learned through enforcement, but law’s ability to teach goes 
beyond this.  The abortion laws in place prior to Roe served as an imperfect 
though still effective teacher, reminding women and men of both the gravity of 
the act of abortion and its lethal and irreversible consequences.  They 
reaffirmed the life-nurturing values already present in American society and so 
encouraged people to do what they already knew to be right. 
Plainly, not everyone listened to this message nor was every illegal 
abortion that did take place subject to criminal prosecution.  The evidence 
indicates, however, that the abortion laws in place prior to Roe “effectively 
inhibited the performance of abortions”337 even when such laws were not 
properly enforced in every instance.  Indeed, the law in place at that time 
plainly influenced the cultural outlook of society in a way that was reflected in 
the actions of American women.  Put another way, the enormous difference 
between the likely incidence of abortion prior to the liberalization of abortion 
laws by the states in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the staggering 
frequency of abortion following the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade 
shows that law’s teaching function goes beyond the concrete application of a 
statute in particular cases of enforcement.  This is a lesson that John Paul well 
knew and which Skeel and Stuntz would do well to remember. 
CONCLUSION 
In ordering the day-to-day affairs of most people within a given society, 
culture is indeed vastly more important than law.  Indeed, culture enjoys a kind 
priority over law insofar as all law is generated and exists within a given 
culture.  At the same time, law also influences the development of culture 
through its effect on the behavior and beliefs of the individuals subject to it.  
Because John Paul II understood this vital relationship, he recognized that the 
legal prohibition of unjust actions is never sufficient to remove the “structures 
of sin” that sometimes dominate society.  Instead, he understood that “[t]he 
changing of laws must be preceded and accompanied by the changing of 
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mentalities and morals.”338  That is, because culture enjoys a kind of priority 
over law, legal change can greatly contribute to the process of cultural 
renovation, but law can never be a substitute for it. 
In arguing on behalf of “legal modesty” from a Christian perspective, 
David Skeel and William Stuntz seem both to agree with Pope John Paul and 
to appreciate law’s limits.  Indeed, they recognize that when the subject matter 
of a legal rule exceeds law’s ability to regulate, it may in fact undermine the 
rule of law by vesting inordinate discretion in public officials.  Thus, they 
argue that lawmakers should refrain from engaging in “legal moralism” by 
enacting “purely symbolic laws” intended more as a means of political 
expression than as a mechanism for the enforcement of basic standards of 
conduct. 
Although examples of legal moralism clearly exist, Skeel and Stuntz 
incorrectly place laws regulating abortion in this category of legal excess.  This 
unfortunate move constitutes a significant departure from both the teaching of 
John Paul II and the wider Christian tradition.  Indeed, this wider tradition, as 
reflected in the magisterium of the late Pope, recognizes that law can indeed 
teach beyond the particular instances in which a specific ordinance is enforced.  
That is, unlike Skeel and Stuntz, John Paul recognized the “sometimes decisive 
role” that law plays “in influencing patterns of thought and behaviour”339 even 
when the law is not enforced with perfect regularity. 
This decisive role that law can play in the culture of a society is reflected 
in the historical record concerning the legal regulation of abortion in the 
United States prior to state efforts at liberalization and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe v. Wade.  Unfortunately, Skeel and Stuntz ignore the 
substantial literature on this subject.  Instead they rely upon a single empirical 
source in a facile and uncritical manner.  A more thorough review of the 
available evidence indicates that, although abortion was widely practiced 
during this time, the subsequent legalization of the procedure multiplied the 
incidence of abortion several fold.340 
Accordingly, Skeel and Stuntz fail to demonstrate that the laws prohibiting 
abortion prior to the current era of legalization were either purely symbolic or 
immodest.  Laws that restrict abortion are indeed modest insofar as they seek 
to protect the lives of unborn human beings—a point that John Paul repeatedly 
emphasized and upon which Skeel and Stuntz are conspicuously silent. 
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The incalculable worth of every human being was always foremost in the 
mind of Pope John Paul II.  Indeed, the dignity of the human person was at the 
center of his service as Peter’s successor.341  Although he was not a lawyer, as 
Pope he made a substantial contribution to the proper understanding of law and 
its limits.  John Paul knew that law had a crucial role to play in combating the 
“structures of sin” and securing the dignity of every human being.  At the same 
time, he knew that law is derivative of culture and that it is primarily through 
culture that men and women find the answers to life’s questions.  Although 
justice is the measure of both law’s modesty and law’s ambition, the human 
heart’s desire for justice exceeds law’s ability to control.  Thus, like Father 
Zosima, John Paul taught that justice will take root only when we come to 
recognize that “every one of us is answerable for everyone else.”342  The 
witness that Karol Wojtyla bore to this truth in his teaching and in his life is 
something for which his pontificate will long be remembered.  Indeed, it is 
something for which the entire human family should be grateful. 
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